APPENDIX ONE

DESCRIBING THE DUALITY OF METAPHOR

Introduction

The purpose of this appendix is to relate the basic understanding of metaphor assumed in the body of the dissertation to other significant ways of describing how metaphor works. The first challenge for such an overview of different perspectives is the lack of unified language in the broad field of metaphor theory: different descriptions of metaphor often use quite different technical terms.[1] In order to relate different ways of talking about metaphor, the appendix will use a common vocabulary to describe different theories characterized by different technical jargon.[2]

Definition of Terms

As a way of furnishing a touchstone for different descriptions of metaphor, the appendix borrows terms from general linguistics and uses them to describe metaphor theory. Figure A1, below, is a reproduction of the "semiotic triangle," giving both basic semiotic terms and their relationships.

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[1] Even before the explosive proliferation of writings on metaphor theory began in the late 1970's, Max Black noted that "there is probably no hope of getting an accepted terminology so long as writers upon the subject are still so much at variance with one another." Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), 47.

[2] Although choosing technical terms to use as a baseline is not intended to be tantamount to choosing a communications model in general, the two are certainly related. Rather than offering a comprehensive theory of communication, however, this appendix limits itself to describing and relating different perspectives on metaphor to each other and to the narrative approach offered in the body of the dissertation.

Conceptual Signified

Signifier   **Referent**

Figure A1. The Semiotic Triangle[3]

The three terms that this semiotic triangle relates—Signifier, Conceptual Signified, and Referent—are central to the linguistic approach characterized by Ferdinand de Saussure's seminal work, *Cours de Linguistique Générale*.[4] These three terms are defined in relationship to one another: in a text or utterance, the *Signifier* is any signal or sign that evokes a *Conceptual Signified*, that is, a complex of characteristics "in the mental world of the receptor"; the *Referent* is what the utterance is about.[5] A Signifier is used to label a Referent, applying the Conceptual Signified, or complex of characteristics, evoked by the Signifier to that Referent. A brief example will serve to demonstrate the relationships between these terms.

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[3] Source: James W. Voelz, *What Does This Mean?: Principles of Biblical Interpretation in the Post-modern World*, 2d ed. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1995), 96. Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics,* Advances in Semiotics, gen. ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1976), 59–60, suggests that the "most common form" of the semiotic triangle is the one suggested by Ogden and Richards in 1932 which relates Symbol, Reference, and Referent. Eco takes this as a translation of Pierce's triangle Representamen, Interpretant, and Object which itself "is often considered to be equivalent to" Frege's 1892 triangle relating Zeichen, Sinn, and Bedeutung. In his discussion of the semiotic triangle, Eco rightly notes that "Objects [real world entities] are not considered within Saussure's linguistics" (60); in other words, the Saussurian "Referent" in the semiotic triangle reproduced in figure A1 is the referent of an utterance, not a real-world referent. Footnote 7, below, describes this distinction more fully, while n. 9 suggests the significance of this distinction from a metaphor theory perspective.

[4] Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course on General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).

[5] See Voelz, *What Does This Mean?*, chapter 4.

The word "dog" can be used in an utterance (spoken or written) to evoke a complex of characteristics related to an animal that has four legs and a tail, and barks. The word "dog" (Signifier) is not a dog (Referent); it is a word. The complex of characteristics evoked by the word "dog" in the mind of the hearer or reader (Conceptual Signified) is also not a dog. Figure A2, below, makes this distinction.[6]


Figure A2. The Signifier, Conceptual Signified, and Referent of "D-O-G"

A simpler, "shorthand" version of the semiotic triangle in figure A1 above can reproduce the basic relationship in an utterance between (1) the marks "d-o-g" on the page, (2) the complex of characteristics evoked by the word "dog," and (3) a dog (see figure A3, below).

$$S. \longrightarrow C.S. \longrightarrow R.$$

Figure A3. Signifier, Conceptual Signified, Referent

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[6] Signifiers are not limited to single words; groups of words or sentences—even entire utterances like a sermon or an epistle—can be described as Signifiers that evoke a complex of characteristics (Conceptual Signifieds) and are about something (Referent). In fact, Signifiers don't have to be words at all. Although we are working primarily with spoken or written communication here, almost anything can be "read" as a Signifier, including things like images, body language, or inflection. In figure A2, for example, the marks on the page, "d-o-g," intend to convey specifically the written word "dog," while the "thought cloud" around the complex of characteristics evoked by the word intends to covey the thought-world nature of the Conceptual Signified. Likewise, the pictogram 🐕 signifies a real-world animal we call "dog" and is not intended to mean "an image of a dog."

This simplified version of the semiotic triangle will be useful for describing where different metaphor theories focus their attention. Before the discussion moves on to metaphor, however, two important features of this simplified diagram need a few words of clarification. First of all, the dotted line between the Signifier and the Referent in figure A1, above, has been omitted in figure A3 for more than just simplicity's sake: the relationship between Signifiers and Referents is in fact only an arbitrary one.[7] In other words, there is no reason why "d-o-g" should mean dog (🐕) and not *cat* or *fox* or *a box of chocolates* except for cultural convention.

Second, the directionality indicated by the arrows in figure A3—as well as in A2—is appropriate only because these figures assume the perspective of a hearer or reader. For the receiver[8] of a communication, a Signifier evokes a complex of characteristics. The interpreter then searches for an appropriate referent. If one is found, the hearer knows what the speaker is talking about. This movement from Signifier to Conceptual Signified to Referent, however, only holds from the perspective of the interpreter. As the producer of an utterance, a speaker might

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[7] "The **relationship between words and meanings is a product of convention** and is not intrinsic." Voelz, *What Does this Mean?*, 91, emphasis original. Furthermore, according to Bernard C. Lategan, "Reference: Reception, Redescription, and Reality" in *Text and Reality: Aspects of Reference in Biblical Texts*, Bernard C. Lategan and Willem S. Vorster, Semeia Studies, ed. Lou H. Silberman (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985), 83 the *dotted* line between the Signifier and the Referent, shown in figure A1 but omitted in figure A3, indicates the potential problem of a Referent "being absent or even non-existent in 'reality.'" Lategan's example is a "unicorn," which we can talk about even though it doesn't exist. The unicorn question, however, is not properly concerned with the relationship between the Signifier and the Referent, but between the Referent of an utterance and an entity in the real world. If someone says, "unicorn," a one-horned equine *is* the *referent of the utterance*, i.e., what the speaker is talking about, even if such a mythical creature does not exist *in the real world*. We can perhaps see this more clearly in a case of mistaken identity, as when a dog in the real world is misperceived and therefore mislabeled as a "fox." A dog in the real world is not a fox, but a dog can still be the referent of "f-o-x" in the sentence, "Which way did that fox go?" if a farmer mistakes the animal out by the chicken coop at twilight.

[8] Terms like "receiver," "receptor," or "sender" tend to fit within the broader (metaphorical) way of understanding communication as a kind of packaging–transmission–unpackaging process. See Michael J. Reddy, "The Conduit Metaphor: A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language about Language," in *Metaphor and Thought,* 2d ed.*,* ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 164–201. This metaphor for communication, like all metaphors, both highlights and hides important aspects of the target domain. Using language that draws on this basic way of imagining the communication process is not an unqualified endorsement. Basic assumptions inherent in the model are not addressed here because this presentation intends to provide a way of comparing and contrasting different approaches to metaphor (which themselves may presuppose different communications models) rather than demonstrating a comprehensive theory of human communication in general.

well see a particular dog in the real world (referent), recognize enough of its characteristics as corresponding to characteristics stored in her mental world[9] (conceptual signified) to identify it, and then ask, "Is this your *dog*?" (signifier) as opposed to, for example, "Is this your *box of chocolates*?"

Though the relationships between signifier, conceptual signified, and referent work in both directions, as it were, much of metaphor theory takes the perspective of the interpreter. The arrows in figure A3 and subsequent diagrams will therefore seem natural and unproblematic. This directionality, however, is not inherent in the relationship between signifier, conceptual signified, and referent: the directional arrows in A3 assume an act of interpretation as opposed to production.[10]

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[9] Perceiving a complex of characteristics and labeling the thing in the real world that evidences these perceived characteristics again brings up the distinction between a "real world referent" and the referent of an utterance. If we ask the question, " 'Where are the referents of signifiers in a discourse actually located?'" then "it is tempting to simply to say 'in the real world outside' . . . It is probable, however, that all referents are, actually, in the mental world of the communicator, in the perceptions of the world outside, or in the conceptions of the mind drawn from experience with the perceived world outside" (Voelz, *What Does This Mean?*, 96–07, n. 22).

The argument is not that reality "out there" doesn't exist independent of our perceptions, but rather, that we have no unmediated access to reality. We perceive through our bodily senses a complex of characteristics and retrieve from our memory world a set of more or less congruent characteristics that allow us to label what we perceive. This distinction between our perceptions of reality and the complex of characteristics from our memory world we use to label the perceived reality around us can be related to metaphor: "The fact that we see relations between conceptual signifieds and referents which are not exactly congruent is itself a manifestation of what has been termed 'metaphoric process' . . . It is closely related to the 'seeing as' process by which we label referents with signifiers in literal usage—finding some characteristics to be congruent with those of certain conceptual signifieds . . . This fact has led many, including this author, to see metaphor as the basic medium by which one deals with reality" (Voelz, *What Does This Mean?*, 170, n. 4).

To understand metaphor this way, however, is to define metaphor primarily in terms of the relationship between the complex of characteristics evoked by a signifier and the complex of characteristics perceived to be true of its referent. Such an understanding of metaphor does not see a basic duality of domains as the defining feature of metaphor. We must therefore distinguish between (1) the suggestion that all language may be metaphorical based on the fact that no conceptual signifieds correspond perfectly to referents, and (2) the suggestion that all language is metaphorical because we never conceive of anything completely on its own terms. The second presupposes duality as the defining characteristic of metaphor while the first decidedly does not. George Lakoff and Mark Turner treat the second but not the first under the heading, "*The It's All Metaphor Position,*" in *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 133–35.

[10] For a more complex diagram that relates Signifier, Conceptual Signified, and Referent from the perspectives of both the speaker and the interpreter, see Voelz, *What Does This Mean?*, 95. The diagram offered here assumes the fuller description presented there. Figure A3 is less descriptive but easier to work with for our present purposes.

Admittedly, the language of signifier, conceptual signified, and referent is not widely used in metaphor theory.[11] Part of the challenge of describing different perspectives on the mechanics of metaphor, however, is the fact that there is *no* unified language widely used by contrasting theorists. Saussure's terminology will therefore function as a kind of common denominator for understanding and relating different views on the workings of metaphor.

Linear Descriptions of Metaphor

The narrative approach to metaphor advocated in this dissertation assumes that the interpretation of metaphor depends on a basic duality. This appendix therefore describes different approaches to this duality, locating a narrative approach among other significant perspectives. At the same time, not all metaphor theories consider some kind of duality to be metaphor's defining feature. For some, the defining factor in metaphor is that metaphors are patently false when considered literally. This understanding of metaphor entails a particular view of the literal. In fact, figure A3, above, sums up one basic way of describing literal language: "when a signifier [S.] is used literally, **all characteristics of the conceptual signified** [C.S.] **it evokes correspond to those of the referent** [R.]."[12] Literal language, as it is often experienced or conceived, exhibits a fairly straightforward relationship between CS and R, indicated by the solid line in figure A3. This straightforward relationship between CS and R is disrupted by non-literal language in general and by metaphor in particular. If literal language has a solid line connecting the conceptual signified to the referent, metaphor can have only a broken line. CS and R are still somehow connected, but "*all* the characteristics of the conceptual

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[11] Eva Feder Kittay, for example, uses concepts from Saussure, though not his technical terms in *Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). I have chosen Saussure as a basic framework mostly because his work is well known in the fields of hermeneutics and exegesis. Saussure's approach also forms the basis for the hermeneutics text used in training pastors and preachers in my own denomination and will therefore be familiar to many in my readership.

[12] Voelz, *What Does This Mean?*, 169, emphasis original.

signified" evoked by a signifier *decidedly do not* "correspond to those of the referent."[13] When Jesus labels Herod, "that fox" in Luke 13:32, for example, there are many things evoked by the signifier "fox" that do not correspond to the person Herod. (The name "Herod" is a different way of labeling the same person.) Considering metaphor primarily along the single axis of the relationship between signifier, conceptual signified, and referent, metaphor as a breakdown of the literal can be expressed by figure A3', below.

$$S. \longrightarrow C.S. \dashrightarrow R.$$

Figure A3'. Metaphor as a Breakdown of the Literal

In the "*emotivist*" and "*intentionalist*" approaches to metaphor described by Eva Feder Kittay, for example, metaphor use eliminates the literal, cognitive elements of an utterance while highlighting other, non-cognitive elements evoked by the utterance, like emotion or connotation.[14] Proponents of what Kittay calls the "feature addition/deletion thesis" also explain metaphor without reference to duality.[15] An utterance like "Man is a wolf," can be described in terms of the semantic features which are added or deleted in order to make sense out of the metaphorical utterance: "We note that selections which *wolf* imposes upon the feature system of *man* have been violated: a member of the class having the feature [+ human] is being asserted to

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[13] Because it follows directly on the heals of the definition of literal language cited above, it is easy to read Voelz's definition of metaphor in line with this linear model: "When language employs **metaphor, the referent** [R] **is labeled by using a signifier** [S] **which evokes a complex of characteristics** [CS] **only** *some* **of which correspond to the characteristics of the referent**" (169). In light of other parts of *What Does This Mean?*, however, I read Voelz as more complex than this (see figure A8 and n. 67, below).

[14] Kittay, *Metaphor*, 178–79. Kittay is using terminology from I. Scheffler, *Beyond the Letter: A Philosophical Inquiry into Ambiguity, Vagueness, and Metaphor in Language* (London: Routledge, 1979).

[15] *Metaphor*, 196. Kittay uses "componential semantics," based in the theory presented in J. J. Katz and J. A. Fodor, "The Structure of a Semantic Theory," *Language* 39 (1963): 170–210, as her prime example of this approach. For a brief overview of componential semantics, see Kittay, *Metaphor*, 52, n. 10.

be a member of the class having the feature [+canine (- human)]."[16] Metaphor is therefore a

"deviant but interpreted linguistic structure."[17] Like the emotivist and intentionalist approaches

mentioned above, the feature addition/deletion approach remains on a single plane of S–CS–R

relationships. Together, these kinds of metaphor theories can be designated "linear" approaches.

From a linear perspective, the duality of domains central to other approaches is not considered a

primary factor in the dynamics of metaphor.

Linear approaches often assume that metaphor involves a breakdown of the literal

communication process.[18] Though an obvious falsity or breakdown of the literal indeed seems to

be evidenced by many metaphors (man is *not* a wolf, Herod is *not* a fox), this is not true of all

metaphors,[19] nor does metaphor interpretation begin after a failed attempt at a literal reading, as

is often supposed. Taking a failure of—or deviance from—the literal as metaphor's defining

feature is therefore problematic.

Not all linear approaches to metaphor, however, assume literal falsity as a prerequisite. If

metaphor is seen as a linear relationship between CS and R in which *not all* of the characteristics

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[16] Robert J. Matthews, "Concerning a 'Linguistic Theory' of Metaphor," *Foundations of Language* 7 (1971), 421–22. Quoted in Andrea L. Weiss, *Figurative Language in Biblical Prose Narrative: Metaphor in the Book of Samuel*, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum, vol. 107 (Boston: Brill, 2006), 43.

[17] Ibid., 418.

[18] The fact that a metaphor is ostensibly false if taken literally is seen as a defining feature not only by many linear approaches, but also by some approaches that see metaphor's duality as highly significant. Paul Ricoeur, for example, writes: "Metaphorical reference, it will be recalled, consists in the fact that the effacement of descriptive reference . . . is revealed to be . . . the negative condition for freeing a more radical power of reference to those aspects of our being-in-the-world that cannot be talked about directly. These aspects are intended, in an indirect but positively assertive way, by means of the new pertinence that the metaphorical utterance establishes at the level of sense, on the ruins of the literal sense abolished by its impertinence." Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984; paperback ed., 1990) 80 (page citations are to the paperback edition). Ricoeur does not leave his analysis at this level of surface falsity, but this basically linear description does form an important foundation for the rest of his discussion.

[19] Kittay, for example, shows clearly that metaphors need not be semantically impertinent in order to be metaphors. She borrows an example from Michael Reddy, "The rock is getting brittle with age," to show that, even though this sentence is not semantically ill-formed in any way, when it is said *of a professor emeritus*, it is nonetheless a metaphor (*Metaphor*, 24, 42–76). By considering the sentence both as it would apply to a rock and as it would apply to a professor, Kittay is already on the way to highlighting the duality inherent in metaphor.

evoked are true of the referent, it is a small step to suggest there are relatively few cases in which *absolutely everything* in CS can be applied to R. If this is the case, then the literal usage from which metaphor is said to deviate, that is, a language usage where *all* characteristics in CS apply to R, becomes a myth. Metaphor is no longer viewed as *deviant* because metaphorical and literal become ends of a spectrum rather than opposites: as more and more characteristics in CS apply to R, a statement will be perceived as more and more literal; the fewer the characteristics that apply to R, the more a statement will be seen as metaphorical. From this perspective, it makes sense to say that "the statement *An ostrich is a kind of bird*, though not a metaphor, would be closer to a metaphor than *A Robin is a kind of bird*."[20] If the focus is only on the relationship between CS and R, it may even make sense to say that almost everything is a metaphor, since it is almost always the case that, even in literal language, some discontinuity exists between the complex of characteristics evoked by an utterance and the utterance's referent.[21]

At the other end of the communication process, if *all language* is taken to be only an *approximation* of a speaker's thoughts intended to evoke by approximation similar thoughts in the mind of the hearer, then metaphor becomes a good example of "loose talk" in general rather than a unique cognitive or linguistic phenomenon.[22] From this perspective, speakers are specific enough to be relevant for the context of the utterance without ever expecting *all* of the complex of characteristics evoked by a signifier to correspond to any given referent. In the same way, the

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[20] Andrew Goatly, *The Language of Metaphors* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 19. This evaluation is based on the fact that a robin has more characteristics of a prototypical bird than an ostrich does, since ostriches can't fly. In other words, the complex of characteristics evoked by the signifier "bird" will correspond more completely to a robin referent than to an ostrich.

[21] See n. 9, above.

[22] This is the line of reasoning in Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition.* 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995). Metaphor is not particularly unique and therefore does not receive detailed description in their work, though Adrian Pilkington, *Poetic Effects: A Relevance Theory Perspective* (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2000) elaborates the relevance theory approach in relationship to metaphor.

characteristics evoked by an utterance are not necessarily exact representations of the thoughts that led the speaker to use a particular signifier in the first place.[23]

Descriptions of metaphor that remain in some fashion on a single linear plane of relationships—relationships between thoughts in the mind of a speaker, a signifier used by a speaker to express those thoughts, the complex of characteristics evoked by the signifier in the mind of a hearer (which may include inferences, implications, or emotive elements), and the referent of an utterance—these linear descriptions of metaphor are not necessarily ignorant of some kind of duality in metaphor. Rather, the duality of different domains of knowledge or experience is simply not a foundational part of their description of metaphor. Adrian Pilkington, for example, comments on *Juliet is the sun*: "The fact that we focus upon particular properties of 'sun' may be because we are constrained to look for properties of human beings and this narrows down and makes salient a narrow range of possibilities."[24] The relationship between "sun" and "Juliet" in this utterance, which Pilkington mentions only in passing, is central to approaches that, like this dissertation, understand a basic duality as the defining feature of metaphor.

On the whole, some of the more complex linear perspectives on metaphor can describe in helpful ways how metaphorical inferences are made and how metaphors function pragmatically. The more complex linear perspectives tend to be more descriptive than some of the simpler perspectives that see metaphor as involving a duality. However, because the narrative approach

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[23]At this point we have moved beyond the fairly simple diagram in figure A3'. A more complete diagram could show a broken line (1) between the referent of an utterance and a referent in the real world, (2) between a referent in the real world and our perceptions of reality, and (3) between the thoughts in our conceptual world and the signifiers we use to approximate them. Though all of these insights may be valid, describing any of these disjunctions as "metaphor" is, to my way of thinking, making metaphor too broad a category to be useful. If everything is metaphor, as we could claim from the perspective of (1), (2), or (3), then a descriptive model for how metaphor works becomes too general to be useful in actual interpretation.

[24] Pilkington, *Poetic Effects*, 94.

suggested in this dissertation assumes a basic duality to be central in metaphor, the remainder of this appendix will focus on the range of ways in which this duality can be described.

Duality at the Level of Word or Reference

The language of Saussure is helpful as a way of categorizing different approaches to metaphor's inherent duality. Some descriptions of metaphor focus on a duality between *signifiers*, some on a duality between *referents*, and still others on a duality between *conceptual signifieds*. Describing these perspectives in more detail will clarify how the narrative approach advocated here relates to the broader field of metaphor theory.

Aristotle's Basic Definition: The Centrality of Duality

Aristotle gives perhaps the earliest definition of metaphor when he says "metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else."[25] Though Aristotle is writing for poets, not metaphor theorists,[26] his remarks already assume a basic duality represented by figure A5, below: metaphor consists in giving one *thing*—that is, a referent in one particular domain—a *name*—that is, a signifier in a different domain—that belongs to *something else*—that is, the referent in the domain to which the signifier is typically applied.[27] Following later convention, the typical domain of the signifier can be called the "source domain" while the domain to which the signifier gets applied can be called the "target domain."[28] When Jesus labels Herod, "that

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[25] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1457b, quoted in George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 384.

[26] Janet Martin Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 9.

[27] As Kittay notes, for Aristotle these relationships were ontological rather than linguistic (as they would be following Saussure). Nonetheless, Kittay can give Aristotle pride of place for being the first to "recognize the cognitive function of metaphor" (*Metaphor*, 3).

[28] "Target domain" and "source domain" are designations in the Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner approach to metaphor, treated in more detail in chapters 4 and 5, above. I have settled on these terms (as opposed to I. A. Richards' "tenor" and "vehicle," for example) to describe the two parts of metaphor's duality for two reasons. First, the language of source and target makes the directionality of metaphor clear: we map in one direction, *from* the source *to* the target (see the discussion of directionality and interaction in chapter 3). Second, there is no other

fox" in Luke 13:32, for example, he is using a "name" (or signifier) that "belongs to"[29] (or is typically used to refer to) a class of animals in the source domain. Jesus is using the word "fox" however, to describe something besides a fox, in this case, a man named Herod in the target domain. Aristotle's basic definition already gives a sense of the duality inherent in metaphor production and interpretation. See figure A4, below.

Source   (S.)——→ C. S. ——→R.

Target   S.——→ C. S. ——→(R.)

Figure A4. A Signifier in the Source Labeling a Referent in the Target

For the purposes of identifying metaphor, Aristotle's definition works well. From the perspective of an individual word, metaphor does indeed involve using one signifier in a place where another might have been expected.[30] While not all the complex of characteristics evoked

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terminology as widely used—or at least recognized—in contemporary metaphor theory. The use of these terms is not a wholesale endorsement of the Lakoff-Johnson-Turner position nor does it intend to convey that other terms may not have as much or more theoretical value. Source and target, however, remain widely used and sufficiently descriptive.

[29] A name "belonging to" a thing is a metaphor and, like all metaphors, it highlights as well as hides. See chapter 6, above. Suggesting a natural and straightforward relationship of ownership or "belonging" between literal language and reference tends to make the literal seem unproblematic. Describing the relationship between a name and a thing as "belonging to" is fine as far as it goes, but it also covers up complexities that often go unnoticed because they seem so natural or obvious. For a good description of the (often hidden) problem of the literal see Brian Cummings, "Literally Speaking, or, the Literal Sense from Augustine to Lacan," *Paragraph* 21, no. 2 (2001): 200–227.

[30] Ricoeur notes that a definition for metaphor at the level of word, which can be effectively used to *identify* metaphor ("giving an unaccustomed name to some other thing, which thereby is not being given its proper name"— a substantially substitution perspective), is not superseded by a definition that helps explain *how metaphor works*. Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Czerny (London: Routledge, 1978), 65.

by the signifier in a metaphor correspond to the referent—recall figure A3', above—this says nothing about the fact that the referent in question is being labeled with a signifier literally used to label a completely different referent (or kind of referent). When Jesus says of Herod, "Go tell that fox, . . ." what makes this utterance a metaphor is not the fact that only *some* of the characteristics evoked by "fox" can be applied to Herod (which is true), but rather, that Herod is being labeled with a referent that literally labels foxes. From this perspective, metaphor is no longer defined negatively as a breakdown or rule violation. Instead, metaphor is defined in more positive terms as thinking about, experiencing, or speaking of *one thing* (like Herod) in terms of *something else* (like a fox). The unique element of metaphor is the fact that a signifier in one domain (like "fox"), which we could call the Signifier$^{\text{Source Domain}}$ or S^S, is labeling a referent in a different domain (like Herod), the Referent$^{\text{Target Domain}}$ or R^T.

The Substitution Theory: Duality at the Level of Signifier

Based on this description of how to *identify* metaphor, however, Aristotle is often seen as the origin of a "substitution" theory of *how metaphor works*. According to a substitution view, metaphor is defined as one signifier simply "standing in" for another. Max Black puts it this way: "Any view which holds that a metaphorical expression is used in place of some equivalent *literal* expression, I shall call a *substitution view of metaphor*."[31] In other words, S^S replaces S^T (Signifier$^{\text{Target Domain}}$) for aesthetic or didactic reasons.

From a substitution perspective, metaphor interpretation involves finding the correct S^T and reversing the substitution, as it were. Though Jesus may *say* that Herod is a *fox*, what he *means* is that Herod is *clever*.[32] In this description, often attributed to Classical rhetoric, metaphor

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[31] Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962),31, emphasis original.

[32] The fact that "clever" was very likely not what Jesus had in mind at all better fits a discussion of metaphor's

involves replacing one S with another S for stylistic or rhetorical purposes. The duality of

metaphor is therefore focused on an exchange of signifiers, as indicated by figure A5, below.

Figure A5. A Substitution Theory of Metaphor

Classical writers like Aristotle or Quintilian did indeed treat metaphor under a discussion

of rhetoric. To say that either of these viewed metaphor as *merely* a substitution of names or as a

merely rhetorical device, however, is to denigrate both their perception of metaphor and their

understanding of rhetoric.[33] For these Classical thinkers, rhetoric involved good thinking as well

as good speaking: metaphor was a function of both together.[34] A division between eloquent

speech and rigorous thought is foreign to these authors and is instead characteristic of a later,

rationalistic age.[35] In fact, "the crude substitution view of metaphor is not so much that of the

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culture-dependence than whether or not a straightforward substitution is taking place. In other words, what is at stake here is the mechanics of metaphor, not what *this* metaphor actually means or doesn't mean. See Joel B. Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 536 for the cultural considerations involved in "Go tell that fox . . ."

[33] "The case for attributing to Aristotle and Quintilian a facile substitution or ornamentalist view of metaphor seems strong, but we suggest that to do so is to underestimate Aristotle and Quintilian and to misrepresent the nature of their accounts . . . Aristotle by no means considered metaphor as simply a substituted name" (Soskice, *Metaphor*, 8).

[34] Soskice, *Metaphor*, 11–12.

[35] "The notion that an interest in style and ornamentation diminishes or even precludes an interest in sound argument is distinctly modern. The object of rhetoric was to move the will, but to move the will by good reasoning well presented, and not by verbal trickery" (Soskice, *Metaphor*, 12).

rhetoricians as of their empiricist critics,"[36] a straw man set up by those "philosophers of the

seventeenth century who chose as their model the arguments of mathematics and the new

sciences."[37] It is perhaps more proper therefore to trace a substitution theory of metaphor back to

thinkers like Hobbes and Locke rather than Aristotle and Quintilian. Whereas the Enlightenment

philosophers viewed both rhetoric and metaphor as serious threats to serious thinking,[38] the

Classical rhetoricians described not the mechanics of metaphor, but how metaphor can be useful

for eloquence in speech *and* thought together.[39]

Because of its status as a kind of historical fiction or rhetorical straw man for the opponents

of rhetoric, it is somewhat surprising to find various forms of the substitution view alive and well

today. Nonetheless, Murray Knowles and Rosamund Moon suggest that most modern

dictionaries work with a basically substitution view of metaphor.[40] Bonne Howe makes a similar

claim about much of contemporary biblical commentary and exegesis.[41] This tendency to treat

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[36] Soskice, *Metaphor*, 11.

[37] Ibid., 12.

[38] The extreme objectivist position regarding language and metaphor exemplified by Hobbes and Locke was treated in chapter 1, p. 22–23. For a quote from Locke decrying the use of metaphor, see p. 23, n. 76, above. Hobbes, giving reasons for the absurdity of philosophers, lists, among others, "the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper" (quoted in Soskice, *Metaphor*, 67). This distinction between metaphor and "words proper" is the precursor of the 18th century division of the literal and the metaphorical (or figurative). Though we commonly understand the literal as *the opposite of* the metaphorical in contemporary parlance, before the mid-1700's, the "sense of the letter," or *literal* sense (something like "what the words mean" or even "the intent of the author") would have included metaphor. This complicates the issue of reading classical as well as medieval authors and their views of metaphor. See Cummings, "Literally Speaking," 209.

[39] Because both Aristotle and Quintilian focus on *identifying* and *using* metaphor, it is misleading to portray their descriptions as an understanding of the *mechanics* of metaphor. Quintilian, for example, explicitly rejects the substitution theory of the mechanics of metaphor often attributed to him: "the changes involved [in metaphor] concern not merely individual words, but also our thoughts and the structure of our sentences. In view of these facts I regard those writers as mistaken who have held that *tropes* necessarily involve the substitution of word for word" (quoted in Soskice, *Metaphor*, 10).

[40] "The treatment of polysemous words in current monolingual dictionaries seems to suggest a substitution view of metaphor: metaphorical senses are treated separately from literal ones, but their metaphoricity is usually left implicit and not explained or labeled." Murray Knowles and Rosamund Moon, *Introducing Metaphor* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 67.

[41] Howe writes, "Most current work in biblical hermeneutics and ethics that touches on metaphor relies on classical or medieval understandings of metaphor." Bonnie Howe, *Because You Bear This Name: Conceptual*

metaphor as if it were a mere ornamental substitution for a literal proposition can be found

simply by perusing a typical lexicon or commentary. The entry for πολιτεύομαι, for example,

lists several meanings for the word: "1. *have one's citizenship* or *home*;" "2. *rule* or *govern the*

state;" and "3. *live, conduct oneself, lead one's life,*" which includes Php 1.27 as an example.[42]

In other words, when Paul says ἀξίως τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ Χριστοῦ πολιτεύεσθε in Php

1.27, he simply *means* "*live your life* in a manner worthy of the Gospel of Christ," some

variation of which most English translations give for this verse.[43]

Metaphor and the Meaning of 1 Peter (Boston: Brill, 2006), 13. From the context, Howe means something similar
to a substitution view of metaphor. The research by Soskice, cited in this section, along with Cummings, "Literally
Speaking," suggest that this understanding of metaphor may well be a Modern view *read back into* the Classical or
Medieval, but Howe's point remains valid.

[42] BDAG, 686. It would be correct simply to list a literal paraphrase of a metaphor (like "live, conduct one's
self") as one of the meanings of a word (like πολιτεύομαι) only if a metaphor has become lexicalized over time.
Part of the problem with discussing this lexicalization, however, is that by and large the concept of a "dead
metaphor" has included both words that have entirely lost their original meanings and metaphors that have become
standard and therefore take little conscious effort. In order to understand metaphor, however, we must be able to
differentiate between a "pedigree" and a "daughter congregation." "Pedigree" has been severed from its original
meaning of "crane's foot" (metaphorically applied to the look of a written pedigree on a page) to the point that the
original metaphor is beyond recovery without special analysis or development. A "daughter congregation," on the
other hand, may be a "dead" metaphor, but it is far from being lexicalized to the same degree as "crane's foot." To
call one congregation started by another a "daughter" congregation does not take a significant amount of
interpretation and therefore does not "feel" very metaphorical. Nonetheless, this "dead" metaphor can not only be
easily revived, the most important aspects of the metaphorical process—the shaping or structuring of the way we
think about or experience one thing in terms of another—are still evident. As long as our experience or reasoning
about two congregations related historically is shaped at all by expectations or inferences drawn from the domain of
human mother-daughter relationships, then the metaphor is alive in the most important sense. We may mourn if a
"daughter" congregation "dies," but such a loss does not necessarily reflect the "health" of the "mother" church.
Likewise, we know without being told that a "mother" congregation is older than a "daughter" congregation and was
somehow instrumental in the "daughter" congregation's coming into being, even if it is natural for the "relationship"
between the two to dissolve over time so that the "daughter" congregation is seen as its own "individual,"
responsible for its own decisions and livelihood. This is a long way from "pedigree," which carries with it no
structure of inferences whatsoever. See Roger M. White, *The Structure of Metaphor: The Way the Language of
Metaphor Works* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), esp. chapter 10, "The Impossibility of Metaphorical
Senses," as well as Georg Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1980; reprint, with a new afterward, 2003), esp. "The Objectivist Account of Conventional Metaphor," 211–213
(page citations are to the reprint edition), and Lakoff and Turner, *More than Cool Reason*, esp. the section labeled,
"The Dead Metaphor Theory," 128–131, from which the crane's foot example, above, is drawn.

[43] "Whatever happens, conduct yourselves in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ" (NIV); "Only let your
conduct be worthy of the gospel of Christ" (NKJV); "live in such a way that you are a credit to the Message of
Christ" (The Message); "Only let your manner of life be worthy of the gospel of Christ" (ASV); "Only let your
manner of life be worthy of the gospel of Christ" (ESV, with a footnote: "Greek *Only behave as citizens worthy*").

In the case of Php 1:27, we must make an interpretive decision about whether or not πολιτεύομαι has been
lexicalized beyond the point of providing cognitive structure by the time of Paul. If it has been lexicalized, then all

This kind of translation is substitution.[44]

of the commentary on the dynamics of living as citizens and how Christians are like or unlike citizens of Rome becomes entirely moot, much as a lengthy discussion of the relationship between genealogy and cranes' feet would be (see n. 42, above). In the case of Php 1:27, however, the presence of other terms that help establish both source and target domains here and in the similar context of Php 3:20 would support the view that this is still an active metaphor. Another indicator would be the way the term was being used in the extant literature at the time of Paul's writing. Gordon D. Fee, *Paul's Letter to the* Philippians, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995) 161, n. 21, suggests that πολιτεύομαι was "a common verb in Greco-Roman authors, which in the active denotes to 'live in the *polis* (city state) as a free citizen,' but which in the middle (as here [Php 1:27]) meant to 'take an active part in the affairs of the *polis*,' hence, to 'be a citizen' (almost always literally, either of the Greek city state or of the empire). The metaphorical use is rare, since there would be little place for it in the Greco-Roman world." If πολιτεύομαι was commonly used but rarely used metaphorically, as Fee indicates, then it would be hard to see this as a lexicalized metaphor and therefore justifiably listing "live one's life" as one of the dictionary meanings of the word.

Whether or not πολιτεύομαι as a metaphor would have been perceived as a *standard* metaphor at the time of Paul's writing is a separate issue and does not negate the value of describing the structure of the source domain and how it shapes our understanding of the target (unless this usage had indeed become completely lexicalized). Fees' observation that this metaphorical usage was rare at Paul's time would also suggest πολιτεύομαι in Php 1:27 would be perceived as an active or tensive metaphor as opposed to a standard or dead one.

[44] Modern approaches to Bible translation in general evidence this tendency. See, for example, the following from Eugene Nida and William D. Reyburn, *Meaning Across Cultures*, American Society of Missiology Series, no. 4. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1981), 53:

> In contrast with the treatment of actual historical events, the handling of figurative or illustrative reference to events and objects involves somewhat different principles and procedures of translation . . . specific reference to the act of circumcision must be introduced when a text speaks of a particular person being circumcised. But when a purely figurative use of 'circumcision' is involved, it is possible to shift the figure to a nonfigurative equivalent, especially when the original figure does not make sense in a receptor language. Similarly, in passages that speak of blood being poured on the altar, the literal substance must be referred to, but in passages in which the Scriptures speak of a Christian being 'saved by his blood,' one may translate 'saved by his death' or 'saved by his sacrificial death,' since blood is a figurative substitute for 'death.'

The substitution view of metaphor does aptly describe both synecdoche and metonymy. If "blood" were simply standing in for "death," the above description would hold. As soon as they suggest "*sacrificial* death" as a viable substitute, however, Nida and Reburn themselves are understanding more than mere substitution to be taking place. The fact that many contemporary translations take this stance of approximating or substituting for metaphors present in the biblical text is another good reason to consult the Hebrew and Greek. Weiss for example, laments the "tendency among certain biblical translators to transform the concrete, figurative language found in biblical narrative into abstract expressions" (*Figurative Language*, 181). In a translation, much of the unconscious and automatic work of metaphor interpretation will be removed even further from view if the metaphors in the text come pre-interpreted, as it were, prepackaged in literal language.

This is not to deny the complexity of cross-cultural metaphor interpretation that concerns Nida and Reyburn. Though all translation is also interpretation, some translations are doing more aggressive interpreting than others. Depending on the function a particular translation is serving, such help may be useful (though I would still say that hiding metaphors as a regular practice in translation is dangerous). The preaching task requires that preachers work hard to treat the actual dynamics of the original text itself. The method of doing so (consulting multiple translations or the original languages, for example) may vary according to training or experience, but all preachers should be striving to interpret the biblical text rather than interpreting interpretations. In this endeavor, it is especially important to be aware of how much of the important dynamics of metaphor in the text tends to be translated away from a substitution perspective that says a metaphor is merely standing in for something more precise and literal. Such a limited view of metaphor has consequences for how texts are translated, understood, and preached.

The Comparison Theory: Duality at the Level of Reference

Next to, and technically as a subset of, the substitution theory, Black also describes a

comparison theory of metaphor. Rather than merely substituting one metaphorical name for a

literal one, the comparison theory "holds that the metaphorical statement might be replaced by an

equivalent literal comparison."[45] In a comparison, two referents are placed next to each other to

see how they line up.[46] The comparison view can therefore be expressed as figure A6, below.


Figure A6. Comparison Theory

Black explicates the difference between the substitution and comparison views on the basis

of the example, "Richard is a lion." According to Black, a *substitution* view would suggest that

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[45] Black, *Models and Metaphors*, 35.

[46] John R. Searle, "Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought,* 2d ed., ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 94 correctly notes that "the comparison view tries to explain metaphor as a relationship between references." Kittay, building on Scheffler, includes a "*formulaic* approach" in her taxonomy of metaphor theories. The formulaic approach "maintains that we can analyse metaphorical interpretation by reading metaphors as implicit comparisons for which we need to supply the formula that gives us the full statement of the comparison" (*Metaphor*, 179). As Kittay demonstrates on the basis of work by Andrew Ortony ("Beyond Literal Similarity," *Psychological Review*, vol. 86 [1979]: 161–80 and "The Role of Similarity in Similes and Metaphors," in *Metaphor and Thought*, 2d ed., ed. Andrew Ortony [1993], 342–356), a comparison theory based on "feature-matching" as opposed to a "geometric model" of similarity (where two things are conceived of as being close to each other in space) can maintain an asymmetry or directionality in metaphor and even emphasize "domain incongruence" when features in the source and target appear to be identical (*Metaphor*, 186–92). In this case, a comparison view of metaphor becomes much more complex and shares important features with the interaction view discussed below. White also lists "polarity at the level of *reference*" as one of his four types of metaphor theory (*Structure of Metaphor*, 163). Though he reads Aristotle in this light, White's category is nonetheless concerned with "exploring a comparison" (ibid.).

this sentence "means approximately the same as 'Richard is brave.'"[47] In the terms used by this appendix, the signifier "lion" (S^S) is simply standing in for the signifier "brave" (S^T). The *comparison* view, on the other hand, makes something slightly different of the metaphor: from this perspective, "Richard is a lion" is "approximately the same as 'Richard is *like* a lion (in being brave)."[48] The referent Richard (Referent$^{\text{Target Domain}}$ or R^T) is being compared directly to a lion in the real world (Referent$^{\text{Source Domain}}$ or R^S).[49]

Returning to Php 1:27, a comparison approach might say that Paul is comparing living a Christian life to living as a citizen of a Roman colony, especially since Philippi itself was a Roman colony (see Acts 16:12) with the special right to be ruled as if on Roman soil.[50] The metaphor in Php 1:27 would then mean something like, "You know the pride and responsibility attached to living in a Roman colony: remember that you have a higher allegiance calling you to faithful conduct."[51]

For some metaphors where the correspondences are limited and fairly straightforward, Black admits that either substitution or comparison may adequately describe what's going on.

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[47] Black, *Models and Metaphors,* 36.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Of course, this assumes that lions in the real world are actually "brave," a presupposition that already involves a kind of anthropomorphism. Even mundane examples in metaphor theory tend to be more complex than they are usually given credit for.

[50] This legal right was called the *jus italicum* and is generally attributed to Philippi at the time of Paul. See David J. Williams, *Paul's Metaphors: Their Context and Character* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999), 150.

[51] Moisés Silva, *Philippians*, 2d ed., Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament, eds. Robert Yarbrough and Robert H. Stein (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2005), 80. See also, Williams (*Paul's Metaphors*, 150): "Bring the same pride . . . you have in your Roman citizenship to your Christianity . . . live, as colonists do, by the laws of another place." Williams understands the audience of Paul's letter to be Roman citizens. This view is not universal. See F. F. Bruce, *Philippians*, Good News Commentaries, ed. W. Ward Gasque (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), 108 and Stephen E. Fowl, *Philippians*, The Two Horizons New Testament Commentary, eds. Joel B. Green and Max Turner (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005), 61 for views that it would be unlikely that many (or any) of the members of the Philippian church were also citizens of Rome. The distinction between writing to Roman citizens or non-citizens in the Roman colony of Philippi changes the kind of argument (from a matter of degree, "like this, only more" to contrast, "their citizenship vs. our citizenship") but not necessarily the structure of the metaphor.

The more complex the example, however, the more difficult it is to work with either of these views. In Php 3:20, Paul returns to the imagery of the city-state: "ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει."[52] An interpreter could begin to spell out the comparisons, but the question of how interpreters make decisions about what is intended and what is not intended is left unanswered: being a citizen of heaven is like being a citizen of a city-state in that both have an ultimate authority, both have distinctive ways of life, both involve groups of people (?), both can be found in foreign territories (?), both elicit a sense of pride and belonging (?), and so on.[53] One of the shortcomings of the comparison approach is that once a metaphor moves beyond an obvious correspondence or two, there is no available description of what may or may not fit within the kind of comparison being made.

Neither the comparison nor the substitution perspective on metaphor is a full-blown theory. Instead, both perspectives describe rather objectivist ways of treating what is now commonly held to be a much more complex linguistic and cognitive phenomenon. Though comparison and substitution views can be seen as descriptive up to a point, they are both limited by the assumption that metaphor is a stand-in, a place holder for something more precise and literal. They both conceive of metaphor as a kind of duality, but interpreting metaphor in both of these approaches involves removing or overcoming the duality: in order to get at what a speaker "really meant," the literal term or literal comparison hiding behind the metaphor must be uncovered.[54]

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[52] The shift from the verb form to a related noun is not significant on its own from a metaphor theory perspective since, as Black observes, "any part of speech can be used metaphorically (though the results are meagre [sic] and uninteresting in the case of conjunctions)" (*Models and Metaphors*, 28, n. 1).

[53] Williams paraphrases the metaphor in Php 3:20, "A Roman *colonus*, no matter how distant he lived from Rome, could be identified by such things as dress, language, the laws that he lived by—his lifestyle. Similarly, Christians should be identified in terms of the place to which they belong, the person to whom they owe their allegiance" (*Paul's Metaphors*, 150).

[54] Behind each of these objectivist approaches lies a rather limited view of literal language. For this reason,

A more descriptive way of approaching the duality inherent in metaphor is to take the division of source and target domains not as an obstacle to understanding but as metaphor's defining feature. Rather than focusing on the relationship between signifiers or referents in two different domains, an approach to metaphor may instead focus on the *complex of characteristics* evoked by the use of a signifier from a source domain (S^S) for a referent in a target domain (R^T). This moves the discussion from a focus on word or reference to a consideration of metaphor at the level of thought.

Duality at the Level of Thought

Interaction Theory

I. A. Richards was concerned that the discussion of metaphor in his day was plagued by a lack of good terminology. He therefore christened technical terms designed to clarify the duality inherent in metaphor. For Richards, "when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is the resultant of their interaction."[55] The "thought" appropriate to what this appendix has been calling the *source* domain Richards labels the "vehicle." That which the metaphor is actually about, the "thought" in the *target* domain, Richards calls the "tenor." Tenor and vehicle are equivalent to CS^S (Conceptual Signified$^{Source\ Domain}$) and CS^T (Conceptual Signified$^{Target\ Domain}$) and can therefore be represented by figure A7, below.

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descriptions of metaphor that fail to account for any duality in metaphor but have a more nuanced view of language in general can actually do a better job of describing some of the complexities of metaphor than either the substitution or comparison view (see "Linear Approaches to Metaphor," above). A nuanced view of language in general, however, is not enough to account for the mechanics of metaphor, even if it can be helpful in describing some of the pragmatics involved.

[55] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric,* "Lecture V: Metaphor," in *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981)*,* 51.

Source (S.) → C. S. → R.

Target S. → C. S. → (R.)

Figure A7. The Interaction Theory

Richards is not focused on words or referents, but on thoughts: "[The traditional theory] made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of *thoughts*, a transaction between contexts."[56]

Max Black developed Richards' insights further and outlined what came to be known as the "interaction" theory of metaphor, a name inherited from Richards' basic definition. Black moved away from the tenor and vehicle language of Richards and suggested "primary" and "secondary subjects" as a way of defining the duality in metaphor. As Soskice has argued, however, metaphor does not have *two* subjects; rather, *one* thing is being spoken of *in terms of* another.[57] Black's terminology of two "subjects" seems to suggest two referents, R^S and R^T, and is foreign to Black's actual way of treating metaphor. In fact, Black explicitly rejects both the substitution view (which focuses on two signifiers) and the comparison view (which focuses on two referents). Black's terminology of primary and secondary subjects therefore seems at odds with his own presentation.[58]

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[56] Richards, *Philosophy*, 51.

[57] Soskice, *Metaphor*, 20.

[58] Black's theory and method are helpfully described in Charles Forceville, "(A)symmetry in Metaphor," *Poetics Today* 16, no. 4 (winter 1995): 677–708.

Black focuses his discussion of metaphor on the *interaction* between this appendix has labeled CS^S and CS^T.[59] For Black, the "set of associated commonplaces"[60] appropriate for the source domain (what Black called the secondary subject) is applied to the target domain;[61] these associated commonplaces, however, are modified by the very fact that they are being applied to R^T instead of R^S. This modification is what is meant by "interaction."

Black describes interaction on the basis of the metaphor, "Man is a wolf." Black suggests that prior knowledge of wolves is needed in order to understand this metaphor.[62] This knowledge is "part of a system of ideas, not sharply delineated, and yet sufficiently definite to admit of detailed enumeration." The "wolf-system of related common places" is then "made to fit" human kind, "either in normal or abnormal senses." Thus "a suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of implications to construct a corresponding system of implications" about humanity which are at once "determined by the pattern of implications associated with literal uses of the word 'wolf'" and different from "the commonplaces *normally* implied by the literal uses of 'man.'"[63] Black gives an open-ended list of correspondences like "preys on other

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[59] The interaction of a conceptual signified in the source with a conceptual signified in the target domain is labeled "substitution" by White. White's "substitution" is therefore very similar to Black's "interaction" (see White, *Structure of Metaphor*, 302, n. 7). White's description of Black's position sees the interaction primarily between what Black call the "focus" of a metaphor and its "frame," that is, between the words used metaphorically in an utterance and the surrounding words being used literally (Ibid., 164–165). I understand White as taking a minor point in Black's theory and making it central. I read Black as primarily being concerned with the complex of characteristics evoked by a signifier in the source domain and the way this complex of characteristics is changed when it is applied to a referent in the target domain, which the rest of this section seeks to make clear. These differences in interpretation go to show that labels, distinctions, and categories in metaphor theory are seldom black and white.

[60] Black, *Models and Metaphors*, 39.

[61] In Black's earlier work, he understands the primary subject (target domain) also as a set of associated commonplaces. As Forceville notes, Black's later move away from this position is a weakness. Charles Forceville, *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 7–8. Kittay concurs. One of her "modifications" of Black's theory includes the claim that "both the vehicle [source domain] and the topic [target domain] belong to systems, not just the vehicle" (*Metaphor*, 31).

[62] This knowledge could be a cultural set of "associated commonplaces" or it could be knowledge given in the context of the utterance by the author or speaker (Black, *Models and Metaphors,* 39–40).

[63] Ibid.

animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger, and so on."[64] In the process

of interaction, the source domain shapes how interpreters think about the target: "the wolf-

metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others—in short, *organizes* our view of man."[65]

Some have misunderstood Black's concept of interaction as suggesting that metaphor

works in both directions, that a metaphor says as much about R^S as it does about R^T.[66] Black,

however, does not have reciprocity or bidirectionality in mind. In terms of the present

discussion, Black recognizes that there is only one referent, R^T, though language from a different

domain, S^S, is being used to speak of this single referent. The insight of interaction is that the

complex of signifiers evoked by S^S *used of R^T* will be different than the complex of

characteristics evoked by S^S *used of R^S*. In this sense, the set of associated commonplaces

appropriate to the referent in the target domain of a metaphor will affect which associated

commonplaces will be evoked by signifiers in the source. The complex of characteristics evoked

by "Man is a wolf" is neither the complex of characteristics evoked by the signifier "man" nor

the complex of characteristics evoked by the signifier "wolf"; rather, there is an interaction of

thoughts, a *man-as-wolf* complex of characteristics or $CS^{T/S}$, the conceptual signified of the

target *in terms of* the source, as in figure A8, below.[67]

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[64] Ibid., 40–41.

[65] Ibid., 41.

[66] Both those who support and those who reject the idea that metaphor is bidirectional have misunderstood Black this way. For an example of the former, see Peter Stockwell, "The Inflexibility of Invariance," *Language and Literature* 8, no. 2 (1999): 125–142. For an example of the latter, see Lakoff and Turner, *More than Cool Reason*, 131–133. Charles Forceville elucidates Black's theory (and why it is easily misunderstood) in his "(A)symmetry in Metaphor" as well as *Pictorial Metaphor*. Chapter 3, above, discusses unidirectionality in more detail.

[67] In light of Voelz's discussion of the interplay between the "vehicle story" and the "tenor story" in his section on parables (*What Does This Mean?*, 309 ff.) and his distinction between the referent of an utterance and a real-world referent (see n. 9, above), I take Voelz's definition of metaphor to be more appropriately understood in terms of figure A7 rather than in terms of figure A3'. In other words, I do not read Voelz to be saying *merely*, "When language employs **metaphor, the referent** [R] **is labeled by using a signifier** [S] **which evokes a complex of characteristics** [CS] only *some* of which correspond to the characteristics of the referent." Rather, I understand him to mean, "When language employs **metaphor, the referent** [R^T] **is labeled by using a signifier** [S^S]

Figure A8. Interaction Made More Explicit

Figure A8 shows a signifier in the source domain being used of a referent in the target domain, thereby evoking a conceptual signified appropriate to the target-as-source, a complex of characteristics informed by CS^S as well as CS^T but reducible to neither.[68] Notice that there is still a sense of directionality involved. Though CS^T informs $CS^{T/S}$, metaphor is not *about* both the source and the target at the same time; metaphor rather speaks of a target in terms of a source.

In Php 3:20, then, Paul is speaking of Christians living their earthly lives in terms of citizens living as a part of a πολίτευμα. According to an interaction perspective, to understand this metaphor interpreters must first have a handle on the system of commonplaces typically associated with πολίτευμα for competent readers of Philippians. Interpreters who understand

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which evokes a complex of characteristics [$CS^{T/S}$] only *some* of which correspond to the characteristics of the referent [CS^T]" (Voelz, *What Does This Mean?*, 169). This more nuanced definition better fits other nuanced views in *What Does This Mean?*, though comments on the metaphoric process involved in our understanding of reality (cited in n. 9, above) and the designation of some metaphors with high correspondence as "virtually literal" (see *What Does This Mean?*, Addendum 7-A, 176–182) do seem to take a primarily linear perspective.

[68] Black has his own shorthand that accounts for everything in figure A7 except S^T (which need not be and, indeed, most often is not present in the presentation of a metaphor) and CS^T (which Black intentionally omits): S^S corresponds with Black's *F(E)*, that is, a metaphorical expression (*E*) in a linguistic context or "frame" (*F*); R^S corresponds to Black's *S*, or "what *F(E)* would be about if read literally"; CS^S corresponds with Black's *I* or "the relevant system of implications . . . connected with *S*"; R^T corresponds to Black's *P*, "roughly, what the statement is 'really' about"; $CS^{T/S}$ is Black's *A*, that is, "the resulting system of attributions . . . asserted of *P*"; Black omits CS^T, though he does suggest Richards' use of the designation *tenor* sometimes refers to "the implications connected with that subject [namely, *P*]" (Black, *Models*, 47, n. 23). Black suggests: "We must accept at least so much complexity if we agree that the meaning of *E* in its setting of *F* depends upon the transformation of *I* into *A* by using language, normally applied to *S*, to apply to *P* instead" (Ibid.).

Php 3:20 to have a Roman πολίτευμα in mind[69] might suggest some of the following associated commonplaces: a colony is a distinct group or territory (like the city of Philippi) that relies on a different entity or power (like Rome) for its origin and its continued existence in a foreign territory (like Macedonia). Citizenship carries with it both rights (like the *jus italicum*) and responsibilities (like civic responsibilities to the *polis* as well as a general concern for the "welfare of the state").[70] Such citizens, belonging to their native political power while embedded in a foreign territory,[71] also evidence peculiar ways of life that serve to identify them in contrast to other residents of the foreign territory in which they find themselves.[72]

Identifying a possible or probable set of associated commonplaces, however, is only the first step. Interpreters must then ask how this structure of commonplaces related to πολίτευμα organizes their view of living a Christian life. As Black did with "Man is a wolf," interpreters could come up with an open-ended list of the kinds of things that are likely meant by the metaphor. If Christians have their citizenship in heaven, then Christians live by a unique and distinctive set of laws; their ultimate allegiance is to the monarch of heaven; they live as a self-

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[69] Another option would be to understand a reference to a Jewish πολίτευμα such as the one set up in Alexandria. Though many of the complex of characteristics would be the same, there would also be differences. In fact, some take πολίτευμα in Php 3:20 to be a politically recognized religious group like a Jewish πολίτευμα and, further, actually to have been an option suggested by Paul's opponents which Paul is here counteracting. The argument would then go something like this: though some have suggested you Philippians should compromise the Gospel in some way in order to gain status as a legal religion or πολίτευμα, the answer to political persecution is not through such politicking but rather through being faithful to our true πολίτευμα in heaven: the answer for our suffering is a Savior from there. See the discussion in Demetrius K. Williams, *Enemies of the Cross: The Terminology of the Cross and Conflict in Philippians*, Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplemental Series, ed. Stanley E. Porter, no. 223 (London: Seffield Academic Press, 2002), 228–31. Differences in understanding the associated commonplaces relevant to the source domain will naturally affect how we understand what the metaphor is saying about the target.

[70] These characteristics are all highlighted by Fee, *Paul's Letter*, 162.

[71] A sense of belonging ("Zugehörigkeit") combined with a sense of not belonging ("Fremdheit") characteristic of a πολίτευμα in a foreign territory (and of Christians in the world) is brought to the fore by Ulrich B. Müller, *Der Brief der Paulus an die Philipper* (Leipzig: ThHK, 1993), 179 ff., quoted in Peter Pilhofer, *Philippi: Die erste Christliche Gemeinde Europas*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, ed. Martin Hengel and Otfried Hofius, no. 87 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1995), 127.

[72] Williams (*Paul's Metaphors*, 150) and Bruce (*Philippians*, 108), for example, take this feature as particularly important.

governing enclave in the midst of foreigners who live by a different set of conventions and laws; a Christian way of dress, speech, and life is distinctive; *and so on*. In effect, the metaphor shapes how Christians think about living their lives *as Christians*.

Though at times misunderstood as bidirectional, the interaction theory characteristic of Richards and Black is a great deal more nuanced than either the substitution or comparison view of metaphor. Metaphor is no longer seen as a literal proposition dressed up in fancy rhetorical clothes which can easily be replaced by a more proper literal statement or comparison.[73] Instead, metaphor becomes a cognitive as well as imaginative process that is never reducible to a simple, literal paraphrase.[74] One of the strengths of this approach is that it accounts for the way metaphor can function to shape thinking, perceiving, or experiencing, not just speaking. As a general account of metaphor, it highlights important parts of the interpretive process.

Though the interaction view recognizes more of the complexity of metaphor, it also leaves important questions unanswered. What does the structure of associated commonplaces look like and how do interpreters know? How does the structure of associated commonplaces in the source interact with the structure of associated commonplaces in the target? What guides this interaction? How do interpreters make decisions about what is germane to a metaphor and what is not? Though Richards and Black are the first in the modern era to focus on metaphor at the level of thought,[75] they are certainly not the last.

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[73] Black himself suggests that some metaphors may be sufficiently understood in terms of the comparison or even substitution view of metaphor; in this case, these metaphors can be paraphrased in literal language without loss of cognitive content. Any metaphor worth its salt, however, needs the more plenary descriptive power of interaction. See Black, *Models and Metaphors*, 45–46.

[74] "Interaction-metaphors," according to Black, "are not expendable. Their mode of operation requires the reader to use a system of implications (a system of 'commonplaces'—or a special system established for the purpose in hand) as a means for selecting, emphasizing, and organizing relations in a different field." Black sees this interaction as "a distinctive intellectual operation . . . demanding simultaneous awareness of both subjects but not reducible to any comparison between the two" (*Models and Metaphors*, 46).

[75] Though often described as the father of the substitution view of metaphor, Aristotle could also be heralded as

Cognitive Linguistics

The cognitive linguistics approach to metaphor characterized by the work of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Mark Turner[76] is treated more fully in chapters 4 and 5 of the dissertation. Like the interaction theory, the Lakoff-Johnson-Turner approach holds that metaphor mapping takes place at the level of thought and only in one direction, from the source to the target.[77] Also consistent with the interaction view is the focus on metaphor as a duality of thought. In fact, from the cognitive linguistic perspective, metaphor is *primarily* a matter of thought and experience and only secondarily a matter of language. For this reason, the Lakoff-Johnson-Turner approach is more concerned with the structure of conceptual systems, which shape metaphor production and interpretation, than with the explication of any particular metaphorical utterance in any particular context. Specific utterances are seen as instantiations of conceptual mappings between domains.[78]

In terms of the semiotic model used in this appendix, Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner are not concerned with *particular* signifiers or referents in any particular utterance, but with the way the structure of the broader conceptual system accounts for a variety of particular ways of speaking.

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the progenitor of interaction: "Even if Aristotle himself is ambiguous (as some claim) or inconsistent on his point, the notion of linguistic *interaction* is more important and more central to what Aristotle seeks to say than that of substitution." Anthony C. Thiselton, *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1992), 353.

[76] Lakoff and Johnson relate their study of metaphor to the broader field of cognitive linguistics: "Metaphor Theory is a central subdiscipline of the field of cognitive linguistics, which seeks to provide explanatory foundations for conceptual systems and language in the general study of the brain and the mind. As such, it draws on, and seeks to integrate, recent work in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and developmental psychology to form a unified picture that can explain as many aspects of language as possible" (*Metaphors We Live By*, 270).

[77] Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner also recognize the phenomena described above as "interaction" (source and target domains may cause mutual modification for the purpose of mapping), though the description of this dynamic by these different authors in different locations is neither consistent nor sufficient. A contributing factor for this chink in the armor of the Lakoff-Johnson-Turner approach may be the fact that they work with an inferior form of the interaction theory. They take interaction to be the claim that metaphor works in both directions, and therefore reject interaction outright (see chapter 3, n. 34, p. 89, above).

[78] "Metaphor is not just a matter of language, but of thought and reason. The language is secondary. The mapping is primary, in that it sanctions the use of source domain language and inference patterns for target domain concepts." George Lakoff, "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought,* 2d ed., ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 208.

Figure A9, below, shows a focus on cross-domain mapping in a structured conceptual system, a mapping that may be evidenced by any number of different signifiers or referents.

Figure A9. Cognitive Linguistics

The conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, used in chapter 4 of the dissertation, is a primary example of this approach.[79] In all caps, LIFE IS A JOURNEY does not signify any single metaphorical utterance in particular but rather a range of utterances that adhere to the same structured mapping from the source domain of JOURNEY to the target domain of LIFE. Utterances that describe people as "making their way in life," "getting sidetracked," "needing some direction," all instantiate the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY.[80]

The focus here is not on the way people talk, but on what the way people talk reveals about the way they think: "To understand life as a journey is to have in mind, consciously or more likely unconsciously, a correspondence between a traveler and a person living the life, the road traveled and the 'course' of a lifetime, a starting point and the time of birth, and so on."[81] Moreover, the way people think is *structured*: "The structure of our knowledge of journeys can

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[79] See pp. 105–117, above.

[80] Lakoff and Turner, *More than Cool Reason*, 3.

[81] Ibid., 61.

be seen as having well-differentiated components such as travelers, a starting point, a path, impediments, and so on; some are required and some, like destinations, vehicles, companions, and guides, are optional."[82] Figure A8, above, therefore shows a structure in CS^S, indicated by connecting lines, which, according to this cognitive linguistic approach, maps onto and can also provide structure for CS^T. The particular signifiers and referents used to express the conceptual mapping from CS^S to CS^T are not as important as this conceptual structuring at the level of thought that stands behind and enables any particular utterance.[83] Metaphor interpretation, to this way of thinking, involves mapping general structure as well as specific features from a structured source domain to a second conceptual domain, the target. In ordinary usage, this conceptual mapping often goes unnoticed, since it happens automatically and unconsciously.[84] The task of the metaphor theorist, then, is to uncover the culturally and experientially determined[85] structure of source domains on the basis of linguistic evidence and to explore how our conceptual system tends to map across domains.

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[82] Ibid.

[83] Line Brandt and Per Aage Brandt note that "the practical application of [conceptual metaphor theory] does not concern the analysis of what metaphors mean but concerns the uncovering of underlying conceptual metaphors in metaphoric discourse." Line Brandt and Per Aage Brandt, "Making Sense of a Blend: A Cognitive-Semiotic Approach to Metaphor," (April 2005), available at http://www.hum.au.dk/semiotics/docs2/faculty/private_ linebrandt.html; Internet; accessed 20 Feb 2007, 37. Similarly, Kittay suggests: "Lakoff and Johnson's account is not really a theory of metaphor interpretation. They are more concerned with demonstrating the prevalence of metaphor in our language and conceptual schemes than with the question of how we interpret a metaphorical utterance when we encounter one" (*Metaphor*, 186).

[84] "Metaphor is a tool so ordinary that we use it unconsciously and automatically, with so little effort that we hardly notice it" (Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, xi).

[85] Both culture and experience are identified as contributing factors in determining the shape of our conceptual structure. Indeed, the argument that our concepts are shaped in part by the kind of bodies and minds we have as human beings is one of the central contributions of this general approach. See, for example, Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*. Experience, however, is granted a more prominent role than culture. Lakoff and Johnson, for example, can say, "since our brains are embodied, our metaphors will reflect our commonplace experiences in the world. Inevitably, many primary metaphors are universal because everybody has basically the same kinds of bodies and brains and lives in basically the same kinds of environments" (*Metaphors We Live By*, 257). Though the literature as a whole is usually careful to use the terminology of "near-universal" rather than "universal," the way our experience (and therefore the structure of our metaphors) is shaped culturally needs more attention. See Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) for an example of a start in this direction.

Returning to the Philippians examples, a cognitive linguistic approach would take Php 1:27 and 3:20 together and see how these utterances fit with other ways of speaking and therefore other ways of thinking. While the more common Pauline metaphor for living a life, περιπατέω,[86] would fit well with the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, Php 3:20 could also be taken as an instantiation of LIFE IS A JOURNEY since LIFE IS A JOURNEY includes a particular metaphorical understanding of the end of a life, namely, that DEATH IS GOING TO A FINAL DESTINATION.[87] Singing "I'm But a Stranger Here" as the hymn of the day when Php 3:20 is read connects Php 3:20 to the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY.[88] This hymn selection takes "our citizenship is in heaven" to be roughly equivalent to "heaven is my home," a good example of DEATH IS GOING TO A FINAL DESTINATION.[89]

These verses, however, also evidence other conceptual metaphors. The concept of citizenship *in* heaven is related to conceptualizing geographical areas as containers and political groups of people as physical, geographic areas (and therefore also as containers): people can be "in" a city, get thrown "out of" a political group, or be a "resident alien" "in" their earthly life (see 1 Peter 2:11). These mappings are resonant with conceptual metaphors like BOUNDED

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[86] As Fowl, *Philippians*, 60 notes, "It would be much more common for Paul to use a verb like 'walk' (cf. Rom 13:13; Eph 4:1; Col 1:10; 1 Thess 2:12; 4:12)."

[87] DEATH IS GOING TO A FINAL DESTINATION is treated in Lakoff and Turner, *More,* 7 ff.

[88] As but one example, *The Lutheran Service Book Hymn Selection Guide* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2006), 70, connects "I'm But A Stranger Here" to Php 3:20 and suggests it be used for Lent 2, Series C, the day on which Php 3:17–21 is read as the Epistle Lesson. Homiletical helps based on Php 3:20 provide further evidence that heavenly citizenship is readily understood in terms of DEATH IS GOING TO A FINAL DESTINATION. A single example will suffice: "If there are members of the congregation who have moved back to their home state to retire, this could be an analogy for persons who live in this world but whose commonwealth is heaven, to which they will go at death." Perry H. Biddle, *Lectionary Preaching Workbook: Series II* (Lima, Ohio: C.S.S. Publishing, 1988), 121.

[89] See also Justin Rossow, "If Jesus 'Came Down from Heaven,' Where Does That Leave Me?" *Concordia Journal* 32, no. 4 (October 2006): 388–395 for a brief treatment of how conceptual metaphors like DEATH IS GOING TO A FINAL DESTINATION or GOOD IS UP can cause us to misread the Bible.

AREAS ARE CONTAINERS or SOCIAL GROUPS ARE CONTAINERS[90] as well as LIFE IS A JOURNEY.

Because Php 1:17 and 3:20 can be combined with other biblical passages like 1 Peter 2:9–11, a

cognitive linguistic approach might also see these Philippians passages as part of a broader

conceptual system in which CHRISTIANS ARE A PEOPLE GROUP, THE CHURCH IS A CHOSEN

NATION, or THE CHURCH IN SOCIETY IS A PEOPLE IN EXILE.[91]

    This kind of analysis is not primarily concerned with explicating the meaning of Php 1:17

or 3:20 in the context of Philippians, but rather with describing the kinds of conceptual structure

and mappings that allow instances like Php 1:17 or 3:20 to take place. Since the focus of a

cognitive perspective is heavily on *thought* rather than *utterance*,[92] the important role the actual

context of an utterance plays in guiding interpretation is often granted but rarely explored.[93]

    Like interaction theory, the cognitive linguistic perspective views metaphor as complex and

structured. Some of the same kinds of questions left unanswered by the interaction approach,

however, can again be raised of the Lakoff-Johnson-Turner descriptions of metaphor

interpretation: What does the structure of the source or target domain look like? How do

interpreters make decisions about what kinds of things get mapped and what kinds of things

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[90] Lakoff and Johnson describe "container metaphors" like BOUNDED AREAS ARE CONTAINERS (*Metaphors We Live By*, 29–30) as well as "SOCIAL GROUPS ARE CONTAINERS" (59–60).

[91] These are all conceptual metaphors Bonnie Howe finds in 1 Peter (see *Because,* Appendix to Chapter 9, 367 for a list containing these and other examples). In my list, I have reversed Howe's "Exile is The Church in Society" because I take it to be a slip of the pen: the *source* domain is exile, the target is the Church in society, as Howe herself explains elsewhere (*Because,* 269 ff.).

[92] Though proponents of this theory tend to focus on the conceptual metaphors evidenced by actual utterances, they are also aware that while our conceptual structure shapes the way we speak, the opposite is also true. See for example Howe's comment: "Cultural beliefs are both *products* of conceptual blending and powerful shaping *forces* in conceptual metaphor and other mental space blends" (*Because*, 93, emphasis original).

[93] Related to an insufficient concern for context is the critique that this cognitive linguistic approach fails to give an adequate account of how metaphor interpretation actually happens "on-line," that is, in actual communicative situations: "Lakoff and Turner's approach to metaphor is to focus on the way in which concepts are structured. They do not have a semantic-pragmatics distinction and they do not explain how metaphorical utterances are interpreted on-line. The assumption seems to be that meanings are retrieved directly . . . What is missing from Lakoff and Turner (1989) is an account of how we get from what is taken from memory to what is understood to have been communicated" (Pilkington, *Poetic Effects*, 110).

don't? What is guiding or constraining metaphor interpretation or production as specific

instances of conceptual metaphors are being used or understood?[94] Although the technique of

describing structure or mappings based on the evidence of a range of metaphorical utterances

provides very helpful examples and analysis, by its very nature this approach leaves unaddressed

the question of *why these particular mapping and not others*, because the mappings evidenced

by a range of related utterances are taken as a *starting point* for descriptive analysis rather than

the *end result* of a cognitive and imaginative process.

Blend Theory

A more recent development in cognitive linguistics is an approach that is concerned with

cognitive blending in general rather than with metaphor in particular.[95] Blend theory suggests

that as part of the natural functioning of our minds, human beings take information or

experiences from multiple "mental spaces"[96] and blend them together to make decisions, imagine

possibilities, understand reality, and the like.[97] For example, a nautical magazine reported a 1993

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[94]The example LIFE IS A JOURNEY used in chapter 4, above, includes a range of correspondences like "the person leading a life is a traveler," "purposes are destinations," "the means for achieving purposes are routes," "difficulties in life are impediments to travel," and so on (Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, 3–4). The point here is not to contradict (or even dispute) this list, but to ask where this list comes from. How do we know these kinds of things fit and others don't? Joseph E. Grady, "Foundations of Meaning: Primary Metaphors and Primary Scenes," (Ph. D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1997) notices the same blind spot and suggests his own answer to the problem.

[95] Blend theory is generally taken as complementary to the original work of Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner. Kövecses (*Metaphor*, 227), for example, takes it this way as do Joseph E. Grady, Todd Oakley, and Seana Coulson, "Blending and Metaphor" in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam, July 1997*, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, ed. Gerard Steen and Raymond Gibbs (Philadelphia: John Benjamins) 1999. Others, however, have suggested that Blend Theory and cognitive metaphor theory are contradictory, not compatible. See Line Brandt and Per Aage Brandt, "Making Sense of a Blend," for example.

[96] "Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action . . . Mental spaces are very partial. They contain elements and are typically structured by frames. They are interconnected, and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold." Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 40.

[97] Howe, *Because*, 85, n. 61, identifies Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, "Conceptual Projection and Middle Spaces," *USCB Cognitive Science Technical Report* (1994) as the first presentation of blend theory. Other

voyage from San Francisco to Boston in relationship to a voyage made by a different vessel in 1853 with the same destination and port of origin. The two different voyages were spoken of together in terms of a race, as if the two different journeys on different occasions were a single event. Though this event never actually took place, the blend allows inferences, conclusions, evaluations, and expectations to form: mental space blending has taken place.[98] Although it doesn't explicate the entire theory, a basic blending diagram helps demonstrates this approach and how it relates to metaphor. See figure A10, below.

Figure A10. Metaphor and Blend Theory[99]

significant works include Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think;* Turner, *The Literary Mind*; and Gilles Fauconnier, *Mappings in Thought and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[98] This example, taken from a report in the sailing magazine *Latitude 38*, is used in Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think* (63–65), and in Turner, *The Literary Mind,* 67–71.

[99] Source: Bonnie Howe, *Because You Bear This Name*, 87. A slightly more complex version is provided by Fauconnier (*Mappings*, 151).

According to blend theory, cognitive blending includes two or more input spaces, a generic space, and a blended space. The generic space includes what the input spaces have in common.[100] The blended space, on the other hand, imports (and sometimes combines) elements from all of the input spaces into a blend that has its own "emergent structure" and unique logic.[101]

Blend theory explains metaphor by treating the source and target domains as input spaces and the resulting metaphorical structure and implications as a blended space.[102] In terms of the semiotic language used in this appendix, CS^S is one input space, CS^T is another input space, and $CS^{T/S}$ is result of "running the blend." Like cognitive metaphor theory, blend theory is more interested in a description of a *cognitive* capability rather than the specific signifiers or referents which demonstrate the capability. Figure A11, below, combines these considerations in a way that brings blend theory into relationship with the other descriptions of metaphor in the appendix.

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[100] Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 41.

[101] "The blend develops emergent structure that is not in the inputs. . . . *composition* of elements from the inputs makes relations available in the blend that do not exist in the separate inputs" (Ibid., 42). The result of this combination of elements from different mental spaces is that "familiar structure is recruited into the blended space" which allows us to "elaborate" or "run the [blend] scenario dynamically," giving us insight that was unavailable apart from the blend (Ibid., 43–44). In the nautical example given above, the two vessels from different time periods are projected from their different input spaces into a blended space. The familiar "frame" or scenario of a race is then imported to relate the two. The result of "running the blend" would be the ability to evaluate speed and distance traveled by the contemporary vessel in terms of the speed and distance traveled by the 19th century vessel; in the blend, the first can be "ahead of" or "behind" the second, though there is no actual race. The crew can even experience "winning" or "losing" a race that exists only in the blend. See Turner, *The Literary Mind*, 68.

[102] See, for example, the description of metaphor by Fauconnier: "Metaphor is a salient and pervasive cognitive process that links conceptualization and language. It depends crucially on cross-space mapping between two inputs (the Source and the Target). This makes it a prime candidate for the construction of blends, and indeed we find that blended spaces play a key role in metaphorical mappings. That is, in addition to the familiar Source and Target of metaphorical projection, blends are constructed in which important cognitive work gets accomplished" (*Mappings*, 168).

Figure A11. Blend Theory àla Saussure

As the blended space, $CS^{T/S}$ becomes the central feature of the cognitive operation behind

metaphor. A blend theory perspective Php 3:20 demonstrates that different understandings of

metaphor account for different parts of an utterance in different ways. A blending account of

Php 3:20 might look something like figure A12, below.[103]

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[103] For a detailed diagram of the metaphor "this surgeon is a butcher" see Grady, Oakley, Coulson, "Blending and Metaphor." Howe also uses a blend diagram to describe the metaphor of devil as both a prowling lion and a court-room adversary in 1 Peter 5:8 (*Because*, 87). There, Howe is demonstrating how a source domain can be a blend of two domains rather than showing cross-domain mapping. In other words, Howe does not include the target domain of the metaphor in her blend diagram.

Generic
Space

·An Ultimate Authority;
·Agents forming a group
at a location;
·Characteristic actions of
individuals in a group

Input
Space 1

·Caesar, "Savior";
· πολίτευμα of
Philippi in Macedonia;
·Characteristic actions
of Roman citizens

Input
Space 2

·The Lord Jesus;
·The Christian Church
in the world;
·Characteristic actions
of Christians

·Lord Jesus as Savior;
·Christian citizenship
in heaven even while
Church is on earth;
·Characteristic
Christian lifestyle

BLEND

Figure A12. πολίτευμα Blend

Input Space 1, the source domain, contains things like Caesar as the ultimate authority who

could also be designated by the term "savior,"[104] as well as the city of Philippi with its special

status as πολίτευμα and the Roman citizens who live there and have their own peculiar way of

dressing and speaking and acting as well as their own sets of laws and legal proceedings. Input

Space 2, the target domain of the metaphor, includes things that belong to the situation of the

Church at Philippi, namely, the lordship of Jesus, a group of believers who find themselves yet in

the world, and the kind of actions and way of life Paul is advocating by his own example in his

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[104] See n. 107, below.

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letter to the Philippians.[105] The generic space includes what these two spaces have in common, namely some ultimate authority or ruler, a discrete people group within a broader population or region, and the typical actions that identify this group as distinct or unique.[106]

The blended space gives us the actual language of the metaphor, where Christian people living in the midst of non-Christians are designated as "citizens of heaven," something only possible in the blend since heaven is not literally a physical location or political state that can have citizens. The blend is designed to help the Philippians understand and reason about their current situation and to see their own moral action and lifestyle as being exemplary of the kind of people they are and reflective of the ultimate authority to whom they swear allegiance. In this context, even the term "savior" for Jesus could be understood as a part of the blend. Though Jesus can be called savior in other places in light of the OT witness or his own saving actions, in a context where "savior" is also a political title for Caesar,[107] we could understand Jesus as having a political title that identifies him as the ultimate authority in the blend, though Jesus does not hold any earthly political office in the input space.

Blend theory includes both structure and relationships in the input spaces as well as in the generic and blended spaces much the same way cognitive metaphor theory holds that

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[105] Fee includes elements of both of these input spaces in his description of Php 3:20 (*Paul's Letter*, 162). Furthermore, Fee's discussion of the obligation or responsibilities of Roman citizens and Christians is reflected in the use of an ultimate authority in both input spaces. For the sake of space in figure A11, the ultimate authority is standing in for a sense of origin and obligation.

[106] Justification for including particular elements in any of the input spaces or for making the move from the input spaces to the generic space is not generally given in typical examples of blend theory in the literature.

[107] The title of "savior" for Caesar isn't the only political/military allusion that may be present in the blend. Besides suggesting "savior," Joseph A. Marchal, based on others' research, also suggests a connection to "the imperial cult" in which the "gospel" refers to "the good news of an important military victory or the rise of a new emperor (who often bears the title [σωτήρ]" as well as (in 1:27) "ἀξίως" as a reference to "excellence in combat" and "τῇ πίστει τοῦ εὐαγγελίου" as "a soldier's pledge of allegiance to the general and the emperor." Joseph A. Marchal, *Hierarchy, Unity, and Imitation: A Feminist Rhetorical Analysis of Power Dynamics in Paul's Letter to the Philippians*, Academia Biblica, no. 24 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006), 30–31. Fowl, on the other hand, recognizes the fact that Caesar can be called "savior," but nonetheless understands the term in Php 3:20 first and foremost as "ascribing to Jesus a role and status which the OT reserves for God alone" and then, in a second move, as setting up Jesus as the Christians' counterpart to the emperor (*Philippians*, 174).

cross-domain mappings are structured. Some recurring questions crop up again here: What does this cognitive structure look like? How do interpreters know? Why place *these particular features* in the generic space or the blended space *and not others*? Like the interaction and cognitive linguistic views above, blend theory makes decisions about what interpreters can legitimately include or exclude from consideration without making this decision-making process evident.

Understanding the duality of metaphor primarily at the level of thought has important implications for what a theory can account for well and where its descriptive power begins to break down. Though both cognitive metaphor theory and blend theory are more complex than interaction theory, both of these also move farther away from a concern for the understanding of particular metaphorical utterances in their particular contexts. All three of these approaches also deal with the structure of multiple domains or input spaces and make decisions about what kinds of things should be included in analysis or interpretation without making explicit how those kinds of decisions are guided or constrained.

Duality at the Level of Situation Assumed by the Utterance

A focus on particular utterances in their particular linguistic settings and a concern for how interpretative decisions are guided and constrained both fit with an approach to metaphor that describes the structure and mapping of metaphorical thought as a *situation* in the target domain being understood in terms of a *situation* in the source. Such a narrative perspective on metaphor is not entirely new. Chapter 2, above, notes some suggestions from within the cognitive linguistic and blend theory approaches that narrative and metaphor are somehow related in an important way.[108] From a more linear perspective, David E. Rumelhart claims that the

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[108] See chapter 2, pp. 36–37, above.

interpretation of metaphor, like the interpretation of literal language, hinges on what he calls "schemata," which are used to account for the "situation" assumed by an utterance, giving both *structure* and *narrative* as key dynamics in metaphor.[109] Closer to the theory of Richards and Black, Roger White understands metaphor as "a conflation of two implied sentences . . . simultaneously presenting the reader with two different *situations* in juxtaposition."[110] The idea that metaphor is somehow connected to narrative or a narrative situation is not unique to this dissertation.[111]

What is unique, however, is the suggestion that the structure of metaphor is a narrative structure and that the narrative implied by a metaphor guides and constrains the act of interpretation. In order to demonstrate the importance of the "situation" seminal to metaphor, this closing section will look briefly at the approach suggested by Roger White[112] before relating the narrative approach advocated by the dissertation to the language and examples of the rest of the appendix.

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[109] David E. Rumelhart, "Some Problems with the Notion of Literal Meanings," in *Metaphor and Thought,* ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 71–82.

[110] White, *Structure of Metaphor*, 168.

[111] See also the discussion of narrative and metaphor in homiletics, chapter 1, above, pp. 34–36. The earliest example I have seen of the suggestion that metaphor depends on the narrative setting of the source domain comes from Cyril of Alexandria (ca. 378–ca. 444 AD). Commenting on Jesus' words in Jn 4:35 ("I tell you, lift up your eyes, and see how the fields are already white for harvest"), Cyril paraphrases Jesus: "That is, lift up the eye of your understanding a little from earthly affairs and behold that the spiritual sowing has whitened, as if already progressing to the threshing floor, and calls the reaper's sickle to itself. By the likeness to the events in the narrative (τῶν ἐν ἱστορίᾳ πραγμάτων), you will see the meaning. You should understand the spiritual sowing and the multitude of spiritual ears to be those who were tilled before-hand by the voice of the prophets and brought into the coming faith by Christ . . ." Pusey 3:295.26—296.15, quoted in David Maxwell, "The Search for a Legitimate Figural Reading of Scripture," unpublished document, Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 2007. For Cyril, the "events in the narrative" of harvesting are key to understanding Jesus' metaphor.

[112] Though White is nowhere near as widely known or used as most of the rest of the authors in this appendix (Richards, Black, Lakoff, Johnson, Turner), he still provides an important insight into the dynamics of metaphor interpretation from a narrative perspective. His method has also been appropriated for biblical scholarship in Weiss, *Figurative Language*.

Roger White: Primary and Secondary Situations

Using and critiquing the work of both Richards and Black, Roger M. White suggests a way of describing metaphor that hinges on how interpreters understand the situation implied by the utterance.[113] For White, metaphor is a "conflation" between two sentences, a primary and a secondary one.[114] Metaphor interpretation is a matter not only of finding the right (kind of) secondary sentence, but also understanding the situation assumed by both the primary and secondary sentences. White uses the metaphor, "He *bridled* his anger" as an example.

To get at the primary and secondary sentences, White first identifies which parts of the metaphor belong to which domain (or which "sentence" in White's terms) and then creates "two open sentences, one containing only the primary vocabulary and the other, only the secondary vocabulary, with variables inserted in the place of the missing elements."[115] "He bridled his anger," can be represented by two sentences that contain only those elements that belong to their respective domains:

Primary: He x his anger.
Secondary: Y bridles z.[116]

The next step is to "create two complete sentences: the primary sentence that describes the *actual situation* and the secondary sentence that describes the *hypothetical situation* to which the actual situation is being compared."[117] What is the "actual situation" expressed by this

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[113] White, *The Structure of Metaphor*.

[114] This terminology echoes Black's primary and secondary subjects and is susceptible to the same kind of critique, namely, that in metaphor we are speaking only about *one* thing, though we are speaking of one thing in terms of another. In practice, however, White (like Black) does not treat metaphor as involving two subjects or as working bidirectionally.

[115] Weiss, *Figurative Language*, 87 summarizing White 78–79.

[116] Weiss, *Figurative Language*, 88.

[117] Ibid., 87.

metaphor? What kind of "hypothetical situation" might include someone bridling something for some purpose? For "he bridles his anger," White offers the following:

<u>He</u> <u>checks</u> <u>his anger</u>
<u>The rider</u> <u>bridles</u> <u>his horse</u>
<u>He</u> <u>bridles</u> <u>his anger</u>[118]

White admits that the vehicle (or source domain) "horse" is not present in the text. The thought expressed by the metaphor, however, requires something that it seems natural to bridle: "For most of us, bridling a horse is far and away the most familiar case of bridling. Maybe someone in North Africa would detect an allusion here to a camel in the same automatic way that we detect a horse."[119] In this way, White recognizes the roles culture and experience play in filling in the blanks left by a metaphor. Furthermore, White suggests that there are a "variety of reasons for which we put a bridle upon a horse." In fact, without changing the secondary sentence, White suggests different possible *situations* behind the metaphor:

i   A cowboy at a rodeo breaking an untamed horse.
ii   A farmer harnessing a cart horse.
iii   A jockey preparing a racehorse for a race.[120]

In this case, the *situation* to which the metaphor refers in the target domain functions to limit the possible *situations* that could potentially stand behind the understanding of the source domain: "If we almost automatically choose (i) among these, it is not because we are constrained by the words of the text to do so, but because this gives us the best picture of the man restraining himself when angry." In fact, White argues, a different metaphor might have the same secondary *sentence* while understanding a different secondary *situation*. "He bridles his imagination,"

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[118] White, *Structure*, 93.

[119] Ibid., 93–94.

[120] Ibid., 94.

brings this comment from White: "An 'unbridled' imagination suggests, not one that threatens uncontrolled destruction, but one that wanders unproductively from idea to idea. Hence, the idea of the powerful arab being brought under control so as to be enabled to complete its task becomes the most natural way to hear the metaphor."[121] In other words, a different target domain with a different implied situation results in a different implied situation being highlighted in the source domain.

Along with (1) what seems "natural and familiar" based on culture and experience and (2) the dynamics of the situation understood in the target domain, White also adds (3) "linguistic context" to the list of ways in which interpreters are "guided" in finding an appropriate secondary sentence and situation assumed by the metaphor. In this way, White's concern for the thought-nature of metaphorical comprehension and production does not outweigh his concern for factors that help shape the interpretive process, including both cultural convention and the development of the text itself. White still allows for a kind of interaction—"As a result of such a conflation [between primary and secondary sentences], we are invited to explore a network of similarities and dissimilarities between the two situations, and see the one situation in terms of the other situation, to see it as if it were the other situation."[122]—but this cognitive interaction is being shaped by the dynamics of a *situation* implicit in both the source and the target. Combining these features with the semiotic diagram used throughout this appendix, figure A13, below offers a way of thinking about White's approach to primary and secondary situations and metaphor theory.

[121] Ibid., 94–95.

[122] Ibid., 80.

Figure A13. Situations Implied by the Utterance in the Source and Target

The application of White's approach to the metaphor of citizenship in Php 3:20 begins with the identification of two sentences with variables that express the two different kinds of language combined in the metaphorical sentence.

Primary (target) sentence: Our *x* is in heaven.
Secondary (source) sentence: Our citizenship is in *y*.

A reasonable approximation of the two sentences being conflated in the metaphor must be created on the basis of cultural and textual factors.

Our ultimate authority and hope is in heaven
Our citizenship is in Rome
Our citizenship is in heaven

As an initial approximation of the metaphor, this approach seems to suffer from a substitution view of metaphor, where "citizenship" is simply standing in for "ultimate authority and hope." White's method can also feel rather convoluted in practice and neither particularly user-friendly nor descriptive.[123] The payoff in White's approach, however, is not in the basic

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[123] Weiss, for example, can find the application of White's method "awkward" (*Figurative Language*, 112), at times failing to "capture the thrust" of a metaphor (117). Weiss also points out the failure of White's method of composing a secondary sentence when dealing with "construct phrases like 'bundle of the living' [1 Sam 25:29]" (115) or "metaphorical predications, metaphors in the form '*A* is a *B*'" (118). Nonetheless, for Weiss, "the awkward integration of such phrases does not overshadow the insights uncovered in the process of employing White's approach to biblical metaphor" (115).

method of finding a secondary *sentence* but in the concern for the *situation* behind the source and the target, a situation informed by cultural and textual issues.[124] Returning to the text with White's method in mind, interpreters might ask what kind of situation requires a *citizen* to be *longing* for a *savior*. Is there any cultural or experiential situation for Paul or his hearers that might indicate a relationship between *citizenship* and *rescue*? Without losing the unique way of life that seems to fit with the context of the metaphor, can an interpretation also account for "eagerly awaiting a savior from there" who will bring ultimate victory?

Thinking in these terms might lead interpreters to consider situations in which Roman citizens might expect or hope for military rescue or intervention *because of their status as Roman citizens*. In fact, the book of Acts records just such a situation in the life of Paul when, by virtue of his status as a Roman citizen, he is rescued from an angry mob and even given a military escort out of town to ensure his safety (Acts 22–23). An interpreter with this kind of situation in mind will not very likely read "our citizenship is in heaven" as "heaven is my home." Instead, the eschatological hope of ultimate resurrection victory present in the context of Php 3:20 comes to the fore. Such a confidence in and longing for rescue is present in the text but easily hidden if Roman citizenship is considered in the abstract instead of within the *situation* understood by the source domain of the utterance *in its context*.

In other words, White's method suggests that interpreters not only find an approximation of sentences which describe both the source and the target domains, but that they choose between possible situations suggested by the text. Just as bridling a horse in the example above could be

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[124] Weiss too notices "the dissonance between the hypothetical situation and the secondary sentence" in White's approach (*Figurative Language*,118). Like Weiss, I find White's hypothetical situation more insightful than the grammatically constrained secondary sentence.

understood in terms of different kinds of situations, so Roman citizenship has different

implications depending on the citizen's situation:

  i   A Roman citizen in Rome taking part in a legal proceeding in Rome.
  ii A Roman citizen in Philippi dressing, acting, or going to court as if in Rome.
  iii A Roman citizen threatened by non-citizens in a Roman territory where Roman
military intervention is necessary to secure the citizen's safety.

Of course, interpreters could extended this list *ad infinitum*—or at least *ad nauseum*—by

placing Roman citizens or citizenship in other contexts or situations. The point here (and this is

White's primary insight from a narrative perspective) is that in the process of understanding the

metaphor of citizenship in Php 3:20, interpreters are by default choosing *some* probable situation

that fits the context (as well as the target domain) and guides how the metaphor is understood.

Most of the descriptions of Php 3:20 cited above seem to be understanding situation (ii) as most

relevant to the context of the readers in Philippi. Considering both the narrative in Acts 22–23

(Paul being rescued from the threat of death by Roman military intervention because of his status

as a Roman citizen) and the vocabulary of "enemies" and "salvation" that surround both Php

1:27 and 3:20, it may be better to understand Paul's metaphor here in terms of situation (iii).

Though White's method of underlining and creating primary and secondary sentences is at

times awkward as a way of construing metaphor, his basic theory is nonetheless helpful for

considering the kind of textual and cultural issues that go into the interpretation of metaphor.

Though White is still focused on metaphor at the level of thought, he is also concerned for

particular utterances in context and for the shape of the blanks left by the utterance. White's use

of primary and secondary *situations* suggests that the blanks left by a metaphorical utterance may

well be *narrative* blanks.

A Narrative Approach to Metaphor

Though the dissertation does not follow White's method, his general concerns fit well with

a narrative approach to metaphor for preaching. At its heart, a narrative approach to metaphor

understands metaphor as a duality at the level of thought manifested in language. Describing the situation appropriate to the text and to the culture of the metaphor will help describe what kinds of things are considered for mapping across conceptual domains. In other words, the structure evidenced by other approaches to metaphor at the level of thought is given clearer expression if the structure inherent in metaphor is understood as a *narrative* structure. This narrative structure helps guide and constrain the kinds of things that map from the source to the target. As chapter 3 indicates, the target may impinge back on the source for the purposes of the metaphor, but the direction of the mapping is always from the source to the target. Combining all of these features produces a diagram that accounts for the duality, interaction, structure, implied situation or narrative, and directionality of metaphor (figure A14, below).


Figure A14. Actantial Models in the Source and Target Domains

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Approaching the text and context of Php 3:20 in light of this method requires developing

actantial models in both the source domain and the target domain[125] that are able to account for

important aspects of the text while also capturing the shape of the implications, conclusions, and

expectations authorized by the metaphor.[126] See figure A15, below.

Source Domain	⟶	*Target Domain*
ROMAN POLITEUMA		CHRISTIAN FAITH

Receiver
Roman citizens
in πολίτευμα

Receiver
citizens of heaven,
i.e. the Church

"eagerly awaiting"

"eagerly awaiting"

Object
protection; military rescue;
peace; prosperity; . . .

Object
protection; rescue;
salvation;

Sender
Rome; Caesar

Sender
God

Opponent
foreign hostiles;
enemies of Rome;
. . .

Opponent
"enemies of the cross";
the present "low estate"
of our bodies

Subject
Caesar

Subject
the Lord Jesus

Helper
military power; Roman
armies; soldiers;
. . .

Helper
"power to subdue all
things"

Figure A15. Our πολίτευμα is in Heaven: Actantial Models in Source and Target Domains

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[125] See chapter 2, above.

[126] See chapter 5, above.

"Eagerly awaiting" (ἀπεκδέχομαι, Php 3:20) the return of Jesus is possible because Jesus is understood in the role of Subject who will transmit rescue, safety, and salvation (σωτηρία in 1:28 and the σωτήρ and κύριος himself in 3:20) to those who are a part of the Church, that is, those who are "citizens" of heaven. The power (ἐνέργεια) of Jesus evidenced in his own resurrection allows him to overcome all enemies (ἀντικείμενοι in 1:28 and ἐχθροί in 3:18), including humans set against the message of the cross as well as death itself. Because salvation is guaranteed by their citizenship and because the champion of their πολίτευμα is coming in power, Christians are able to view their lives now in light of the sure victory that is to come. The moral component of living worthy lives (πολιτεύομαι in 1:27) fits 3:20 as well, but both of these are connected textually to the ultimate victory coming in the Day of the Lord Jesus Christ. This reading of Paul's metaphor suggests that he is not merely urging unique behavior in light of the Christian status as people set apart and under a different set of laws. Rather, these moral imperatives (or implications) come in light of the fact that Christians can eagerly await the return of their Savior from the place of their citizenship so that ultimately they will be vindicated. Present suffering now is done as citizens of heaven and in light of the final victory that is and will be theirs in Jesus Christ.[127]

Considering the textual setting and inquiring after the implied situation behind the metaphor leads to a description of the metaphor that is both sufficiently complex and adequately tied to the specific text in which the metaphor appears. Interpretive decisions like which elements or particulars to include or exclude are based on the particular structure of the situation suggested by the metaphor in its culture and context. In this way, a narrative approach to metaphor is similar to other approaches that view the duality of metaphor at the level of thought,

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[127] For additional homiletical treatment of this metaphor, see chapters 5 and 6, above.

interaction of thought, and structure of thought. Questions left unanswered by other approaches to metaphor as to the shape and the reason for the shape of a metaphor's structure are addressed in narrative terms. The roles and expected outcomes inherent in the implied narrative structure help account for why interpreters naturally include some details or relationships when considering cross-domain mapping and naturally excluded others.

Conclusion

While taking into consideration a variety of ways other theorists have described metaphor production and interpretation, this dissertation focuses on a narrative approach because a narrative approach seems most able to account for significant elements in the text and in the culture while also describing the kinds of conclusions that are likely to be drawn in the interpretive process.   This dissertation, however, does not claim to describe *what actually happens* in metaphor. It rather claims that the considerations highlighted by a narrative approach are both significant and useful for preachers approaching both the biblical text and the preaching event. As Richards admitted over eighty years ago, "In this subject it is better to make a mistake that can be exposed than to do nothing, better to have any account of how metaphor works (or thought goes on) than to have none. Provided always that we do not suppose that our account of reality tells us what happens—provided, that is, we do not mistake our theories for our skill, or our descriptive apparatus for what it describes."[128]

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[128] Richards, *Philosophy*, 115.