

## CHAPTER TWO

### A NARRATIVE APPROACH TO METAPHOR

#### Introduction: Our Citizenship is in Heaven

This dissertation seeks to develop a deeper understanding of the hermeneutics of metaphor for preaching because metaphor plays a significant role both in the sermon and in the biblical text. Taking metaphor to be both complex and describable, preachers will ask homiletical questions as they encounter metaphor in specific biblical texts and prepare sermons for their particular hearers. The specific questions relevant to a particular text or sermon will be in some ways unique; preaching metaphors of adoption or light or sheep or citizenship will all involve different dynamics in the text and the sermon. Some *kinds* of questions—and ways of answering questions—will nonetheless remain constant. The purpose of this chapter is to develop the basic tools with which a preacher can approach metaphor in text and sermon from a narrative perspective.

Since preachers often begin with a text,<sup>1</sup> the kinds of homiletical questions that must be addressed by any theory of metaphor for preaching are perhaps best introduced by way of a specific textual example. In Php 3:20, Paul writes: “But our citizenship is in heaven, and from it

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<sup>1</sup> According to David R. Schmitt, “Law and Gospel in Sermon and Service,” in *Liturgical Preaching*, ed. Paul J. Grime and Dean W. Nadasdy (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2001), 25–49, “textual exposition” is one of the fundamental tasks of the preacher; there are others. Schmitt suggests “hearer depiction,” “theological confession,” and “evangelical proclamation,” as other “modes of discourse” important for every sermon. Though the homiletic process or the sermon itself may begin with, or even feature, one of the other preaching tasks, this dissertation assumes that, no matter how a particular text is selected, the exposition of the text (in this case Php 3:20 in its broader context) will play a significant role in the formation of the sermon.

we await a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ . . .” (ESV).<sup>2</sup> What kinds of questions would a preacher preparing a sermon ask of this text?

“Our citizenship in heaven,” is only one of several metaphors in this passage. Even with such a narrow focus, the potential questions are various and diverse. Is this text about *citizenship in general*, i.e., would it be a good Independence Day text? Or is it primarily about how Christians should live their lives *as Christians*? Is it perhaps about both: is Paul suggesting that Christians should be good citizens *because* they are Christian?

What will come to mind for typical hearers in a particular congregation if the sermon focuses on heavenly citizenship? Which, if any, of the hearers’ most typical or immediate associations, like voting or paying taxes, should play an important role in the sermon?

How much background information is relevant for this metaphor? Is it significant that Caesar also carried the title “savior,” that the city of Philippi was a Roman colony, that Roman citizens wore distinctive clothing, had distinctive speech, were afforded legal rights as if they lived in Rome?<sup>3</sup>

How does this metaphor fit within the broader biblical witness? Should Christians, as citizens of heaven, in any way view non-believers as “enemies”?

How do law and gospel relate in this metaphor? Is this text about dying and going to heaven? Should the congregation be singing “I’m but a Stranger Here?” Does this metaphor convey that “heaven is my home”?

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<sup>2</sup> Preachers select texts in different ways. Those who preach from a pericopal system will have more than one opportunity to preach on Paul’s metaphor of citizenship. Php 3:17-4:1 is the assigned Epistle lesson for Lent 2, Series C in the three-year lectionary as well as Trinity 23 in the one year series (without 4:1). A related citizenship metaphor in Php 1:27 is contained in Proper 20, Series A.

<sup>3</sup> Gordon D. Fee, *Paul’s Letter to the Philippians*, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 162, includes these elements in his description of Php 3:20. See also the discussion of Php 1:27 and 3:20 throughout appendix 1, below.

What kinds of inferences or actions does Paul want the Philippians to draw or to take? Should the preacher come up with a list of analogies between the Christian life and being citizens of America? Rome? Is it perhaps better to describe some of the features of citizenship and let the hearers draw their own analogies or conclusions? How can a preacher describe this metaphor sufficiently? What, if anything, does this metaphor authorize a preacher to say?

These kinds of questions are being answered, intentionally or not, every time Php 3:20 and the surrounding verses are used in a sermon. Though these questions will not receive definitive answers in this dissertation, let alone in this chapter, the dynamics of the narrative method suggested by this thesis are designed to help preachers be aware of—and make—these kinds of interpretive decisions.

### **Metaphor Interpretation and Narrative Structure**

The thesis presented in this dissertation claims that one important and helpful way to answer the kinds of homiletical questions raised above is by taking into account the narrative structure inherent in the interpretation of metaphor. Though this dissertation offers a uniquely narrative approach to metaphor interpretation, some precedent for seeing a connection between metaphor and narrative has already been set.

### **Relating Metaphor to Narrative**

Contemporary homiletics and metaphor theory have both at least hinted that the dynamics of understanding the textual imagery of metaphor may somehow be tied to the dynamics of understanding narrative. From a preaching perspective, Richard Eslinger, for example, places a “homiletics of imagery” on the “web of preaching,” a web anchored on the “narrative center.”<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Richard L. Eslinger, *The Web of Preaching: New Options in Homiletical Method* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 10.

He also suggests that “an image’s *narrative context* provides for an interpretive decision regarding the multiple meanings inherent in the image.”<sup>5</sup> In other words, narrowing the possible meanings of an image is deciding for or against different narrative contexts that diversely shape the way in which the image is understood.

Eslinger is building on work by David Harned, who claims: “To name an image is to furnish it with a context—in other words, *to place it within a story*. When images lose their anchorage in stories, they are divested of much of their significance and begin to drift aimlessly, growing enigmatic and increasingly indeterminate.”<sup>6</sup> Hughes and Kysar, like Eslinger, treat metaphor as a kind of image and connect images intimately to narrative: “. . . images are miniature stories in themselves.”<sup>7</sup> Since contemporary preaching theory often treats metaphor as a subcategory of image,<sup>8</sup> what Eslinger, Harned, Hughes, and Kysar suggest of image in general can be applied to metaphor in particular: understanding a metaphor means putting it into a narrative context.

Metaphor and narrative have also converged in the discussion of preaching parables. Richard Eslinger, Thomas Long, and Eugene Lowry, for example, all briefly relate metaphor, narrative, and parable. None of them, however, provides any developed metaphor theory to aid the work of preaching or interpretation.<sup>9</sup> This kind of omission is typical of the broader

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<sup>5</sup> Richard L. Eslinger, *A New Hearing: Living Options in Homiletic Method* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1987), 178, emphasis added.

<sup>6</sup> David Baily Harned, *Images for Self-Recognition: The Christian as Player, Sufferer, and Vandal* (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), 133, emphasis added.

<sup>7</sup> Robert G. Hughes and Robert Kysar, *Preaching Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 58.

<sup>8</sup> See the discussion of image, metaphor, and preaching above, pp. 9–11.

<sup>9</sup> Eslinger uses Amos Wilder’s definition of parable as a “narrative metaphor” to introduce his essay, “Narrative and Imagery” in *Intersections: Post-Critical Studies in Preaching*, ed. Richard L. Eslinger (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1994), 66, without going into any metaphor theory. Thomas G. Long, in his *Preaching and the Literary Forms of the Bible* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989) 92–95, builds on C. H. Dodd’s “idea of

homiletic field. Though image and metaphor are generally assumed to be connected to narrative in some way, especially in the case of parables, a lack of in-depth metaphor theory has limited the potential benefits of this connection.

Just as preachers have noted “a relationship between narrative and image” while “its specific implications for homiletic method have remained largely unexplored,”<sup>10</sup> recent developments in metaphor theory have begun to suggest some kind of narrative connection without working out the hermeneutical implications. Three of the most influential writers in contemporary metaphor theory, George Lakoff, Mark Turner, and Mark Johnson, have all followed up their initial and collaborative works<sup>11</sup> by separately introducing some kind of narrative element either to move beyond or to develop more fully their original theory. Lakoff introduces the concept of “prototypical scenarios” as a way to describe how conceptual metaphors cohere in thought and experience.<sup>12</sup> Turner explores the dynamics of “story” and “projection” and relates both to metaphor.<sup>13</sup> Johnson’s work with ethics leads him to describe both “The Metaphoric Basis of Moral Theory” and “The Narrative Context of Self and Action.”<sup>14</sup> Though it offers no unified method or theory, the current work with “scenario,” “story,” and “narrative context” from several different authors suggests that a narrative approach to metaphor

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parable as metaphor.” The few comments on metaphor theory in Long’s discussion of parable have the same limitations as the comparison theory of metaphor described and rejected by Max Black (see appendix 1, below). Eugene Lowry’s *How to Preach a Parable: Designs for Narrative Sermons* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1989), 21–22 describes the “parabolic nature of stories” and suggests, in passing, that the same dynamic is present in metaphor.

<sup>10</sup> Eslinger, *A New Hearing*, 180.

<sup>11</sup> One of the most influential recent books on metaphor theory is Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, 2003). Another widely read work is Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

<sup>12</sup> George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

<sup>13</sup> Mark Turner, *The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

<sup>14</sup> These are the titles of chapters 3 and 7, respectively, in Mark Johnson, *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

for preaching fits well within the scope of contemporary metaphor theory. This relationship between metaphor and narrative, between image and story, corresponds to general observations in homiletics that have yet to be more fully developed.

The unique contribution of this dissertation therefore goes beyond laying a theoretical foundation for a homiletics of metaphor. This dissertation also advances the study of the connection between narrative and metaphor, something noticed but not explored in detail by either preaching or metaphor theorists. Though this dissertation will not develop a complete theory relating metaphor and narrative, the relationship between the two needs further analysis for the sake of faithful and effective preaching.<sup>15</sup> The present work will move in this direction by describing how an implicit narrative structure guides and constrains (and thereby enables) metaphor interpretation. The result will be not only a basic hermeneutical description but a narrative method, a basic interpretive tool able to facilitate the preacher's careful interaction with the biblical text and careful preparation of a sermon in light of how hearers make interpretive decisions.

### **Structuring the Blanks Left by Metaphor**

The central thesis of this dissertation relates metaphor and narrative at a structural level: *A schema of implied narrative relationships guides and constrains metaphor interpretation*. What does a "schema of implied narrative relationships" look like? In what sense are these relationships "narrative?" Why are they only "implied?" If these narrative relationships remain *implied* rather than expressed, how can they be made available for description and analysis? In

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<sup>15</sup> "A systematic analysis of the interaction of image and narrative . . . may be needful for all of those who seek to move beyond the old discursive preaching. And it may well be that the next stages in the development of homiletic method will depend upon these considerations" (Eslinger, *A New Hearing*, 177).

what ways can a structure of narrative relationships help answer the homiletic questions raised of Php 3:20, above?

Before considering the less common metaphor of Christian citizenship in heaven, more familiar and straightforward examples can help describe a basic narrative method. Jesus, for example, is commonly referred to as the “Lamb of God.” Even without the textual setting of John 1, songs and graphic images repeatedly present the Lamb of God metaphor in Christian gatherings. Liturgically, the *Agnus Dei* is sung week after week by many congregations. Even where the Lamb of God is not regularly sung, other familiar songs, paraments, and stained glass images make this metaphor a standard part of most Christian metaphor systems.

Jesus as the Lamb of God is not a challenging metaphor to unpack. Without much difficulty or reflection, most Christians would likely relate Jesus and his sacrificial death on the cross to the forgiveness of sins and the salvation of sinners. Though some variation in specifics can be expected, Christians familiar with the Lamb of God imagery will naturally come to a general consensus about its meaning without much cognitive effort.

Consider as a counter-example the soloist from a local performance of Mozart’s *Requiem* who, when commenting on the *Agnus Dei* during a radio interview, mentioned that every time she sings a funeral mass she feels bad for that poor little lamb. Obviously, she is misunderstanding the Christological metaphor—but it is only *obvious* she misunderstands it to someone who knows the *Agnus Dei* is about a lamb who takes away the sins of the world, that a lamb taking away sins is a lamb in a sacrificial system, and that Jesus’ death on the cross can be understood in terms of substitutionary sacrifice for the removal of sin. Even when metaphor

interpretation seems natural or obvious, important interpretive decisions are being made behind the scenes.<sup>16</sup>

In fact, how the Lamb of God or any metaphor is understood—or misunderstood—depends on how the hearer fills in the blanks left by the metaphorical utterance.<sup>17</sup> If the blanks assumed by the Lamb of God metaphor are filled in with the knowledge and experience taken from a sacrificial system that conforms to the promise of God in the Old Testament, Jesus' journey to the cross is readily seen as the salvation of the world. If, however, a contemporary animal rights paradigm is applied to the *Agnus Dei*, then the lamb is the one who needs to be saved from cruel and misguided people. How interpreters fill in the blanks determines how they understand the metaphor.<sup>18</sup>

### **Narrative Structure and Metaphor**

What those blanks look like and how interpreters fill them in is the broader topic of this entire dissertation. Contemporary metaphor theory suggests that the blanks left by a metaphor have a shape or structure that enables interpretation. This structure can be variously described as

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<sup>16</sup> Mark Turner, *Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) and *The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) makes the observation that only those things that take conscious effort are typically seen as complex or important. Against this view, Turner argues that much of the work of interpreting metaphor (as well as literature or even language) is too complex to be done consciously. Important and complex moves are being made even in the interpretation of the metaphors that seem most straightforward or obvious.

<sup>17</sup> This dependence on the work of the interpreter is preeminently true of metaphor, but not uniquely true. The interpretation of any text or utterance involves the filling in of lexical blanks. See Wolfgang Iser, "The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach" in *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*, Jane P. Tomkins, ed. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), 50–69.

<sup>18</sup> The question of how the blanks left by sacrificial language for the death of Jesus are to be filled in has led some to suggest speaking of *atonement* is more problematic than it is helpful. See Tyron L. Inbody, *The Many Faces of Christology* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), esp. chapter 6, "Christology and the Atonement: Is Atonement Theology Sacralization of Abuse?" To understand the sacrifice of the Son as divine parental abuse, however, is to blend together Jesus' status as *Son* and as *lamb* in ways which are not warranted by the text. At the same time, even the language of sacrifice needs to be held together with other ways of proclaiming the gospel which highlight (and hide) different aspects of our relationship to God in Jesus Christ. Both the need for multiple metaphorical perspectives and the dynamics of blending are discussed below in chapter 6, "Metaphor in a Preaching Ministry."



a set of “associated commonplaces,”<sup>19</sup> a “conceptual network,”<sup>20</sup> a “web of implications” or “network of meanings,”<sup>21</sup> an “inferential structure,”<sup>22</sup> a “cognitive topology,” “gestalt structure,” or “image-schematic structure.”<sup>23</sup> The common assertion behind all of these various formulations is that metaphor interpretation involves not a laundry list of attributes or characteristics, but a structured meaningful whole that shapes evaluation, attitude, expectation, and experience.

To call Jesus “the Lamb of God” is to evoke not only certain *characteristics* of a sacrificial lamb, but a broader narrative that casts Jesus in specific, *structured relationships* to things like sin, death, blood, guilt, sacrifice, punishment, expiation, forgiveness, the sinner, God. Interpreters know what to expect from Jesus *as lamb* if they know what to expect from a lamb within the structure of sacrifice. Interpreters can evaluate the work of Jesus on the cross and its import for them only if they know how the death of a sacrificial lamb relates to sinners. If the Lamb of God metaphor is interpreted from within a different structure of relationships, then the interpreter will have different expectations and will evaluate Jesus differently: a lamb being cruelly and unnecessarily tortured is in need of rescue by an animal rights activist.

### ***Narrative Structure and Metaphor***

Metaphor, then, evokes a kind of structure, a structure dependent on a specific kind of setting or situation. Interpreters understand John’s reference to Jesus as the Lamb of God by

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<sup>19</sup> Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (London: Cornell University Press: 1962).

<sup>20</sup> George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980; 2003), 7 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

<sup>21</sup> Janet Martin Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).

<sup>22</sup> George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 209.

<sup>23</sup> George Lakoff, “The Invariance Hypothesis: Is Abstract Reason Based on Image-Schemas?” *Cognitive Linguistics* 1 (1990): 39–74.

situating a lamb—and therefore Jesus—in a particular kind of narrative. In fact, *changing the implied setting or narrative situation* assumed by a metaphor *changes the metaphor*. Take, for instance, another common and seemingly straight-forward lamb metaphor, “I am Jesus’ little lamb.” The children’s hymn places lambs in a different kind of situation: “I am Jesus’ little lamb / ever glad at heart I am / for my Shepherd gently guides me / knows my name and well provides me / when I thirst He bids me go / where the quiet waters flow.” This lamb has a pastoral setting, not a sacrificial one. As a result, the “I” in the song is not a lamb in the same way Jesus is. This lamb metaphor includes a shepherd, a protector, perhaps even a green pasture and still waters. Guilt, blood, and sacrifice are no longer in view. The implied narrative, or the “story behind the image,” has changed. As a result, there is a change not only in *how* an adequate interpretation will *fill in the blanks* of the utterance, but in *the kinds of blanks* that are left to be filled in. Interpreting these different lamb metaphors requires the asking of narrative questions: who is doing what to whom with what result? Is the lamb being sacrificed in accordance with the promise of God to remove sin from guilty offenders, or is the lamb being protected and guided and cared for by a loving shepherd? Changing the assumed setting or implied narrative changes the metaphor.

The importance of a broader implied narrative to the interpretation of metaphor is most obvious when a metaphor is specifically taken from a well-known story. Images taken from the Exodus or the wilderness wandering, for example, will be understood most fully only in light of their root narratives.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, calling Jesus the Lamb of God assumes the Old Testament institutions of Passover and sacrifice; the larger Old Testament story helps shape how the Lamb of God metaphor is understood.

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<sup>24</sup> Eslinger for example, suggests that “to evoke the image of manna in sermon or song is to evoke as well the wilderness narrative with its drama of hunger, murmuring, and divine provision” (*Web*, 262).

Metaphors of manna or sacrifice or exodus or cross evoke specific stories; a narrative approach to metaphor, however, is not limited to metaphors that recognizably draw on specific narratives. Even when there is no specific narration from which they are drawn, *metaphors are understood in terms of some implied narrative structure*.<sup>25</sup> If Paul exhorts his hearers to “put on the full armor of God,” for example, his hearers don’t necessarily need to recall any particular story or any particular battle in the history of Israel. They will, however, make sense out of the metaphor by assuming—often without intentional thought—some situation or narrative setting that brings armor into a larger network of narrative relationships. Armor is good for something only in the right kind of situation: armor functions differently in a narrative setting of hand-to-hand combat than it does in a narrative setting of swimming across a river. Similarly, if a preacher tells a congregation their “citizenship is in heaven,” the hearers will understand *some kind* of narrative setting for “citizenship” as part of the interpretive process. Whether or not this implicit narrative is in line with the preacher’s intention or with the biblical text is a separate question.

The role of narrative structure in metaphor interpretation is not unique to special settings like Scripture reading or preaching, but is a part of normal, everyday communication. Even if one fan at a basketball game exclaims to another, “That number 21 is a *bear*!” interpretation turns on whether this “bear” is understood to be in a situation involving *conflict* where size, strength, and ferocity allow a bear to impose its will, or a narrative setting of *hibernation* where lethargy, clumsiness, and extra body fat come into view. Metaphor interpretation includes a kind of structure; that structure can be described in terms of narrative relationships.

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<sup>25</sup> Whether or not we can helpfully describe *all* metaphors, even at their most simplistic or most highly poetic, in terms of narrative structure is not central to the discussion here. A wide range of biblical metaphors commonly found in sermon texts can be productively analyzed from a narrative perspective; the dissertation focuses on these kinds of metaphors. See also p. 96, n. 44 and p. 101, n. 48, below for more on the limitations of the method advocated here.

## Story: Narrative Relationships Outside of Plot Development

The structure that enables metaphor interpretation is a *narrative* structure. This does not mean, however, that metaphor presents a fully developed plot or narration. The field of narratology recognizes several different aspects of narrative, not all of which apply to metaphor. Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, for example, distinguishes among “the events, their verbal representation, and the act of telling.” These she respectively labels “story,” “text,” and “narration.”<sup>26</sup>

The narrative elements in metaphor remain below the surface of the utterance. John, for example, doesn’t relate an epic about lambs, even though calling Jesus “the Lamb of God” places Jesus in narrative relationships appropriate for a lamb only in a setting of sacrifice. Since the implied narrative structure remains by and large implied, the verbal representation of a narrative (the *text*), and the act of its telling (the *narration*), are not helpful categories for metaphor interpretation. The category of *story*, on the other hand, focuses on narrative content and relationships rather than the telling itself. *Story* therefore provides a way of bringing narrative and metaphor together.

In terms of narrative theory, *story* is an abstraction from the text. Story focuses on the events themselves, as well as the participants that bring about the events, as opposed to focusing on the presentation or ordering of the events in the telling.<sup>27</sup> For purpose of analysis, the *form* of these events, with their “separable components” and therefore “networks of internal relations”

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<sup>26</sup> Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics*, New Accents, ed. Terence Hawkes (London: Methuen, 1983; reprint, New York: Routledge, 1989), 3 (page citations are to the reprint edition). Rimmon-Kenan notes that she is building on Gérard Genette’s terms *histoire*, *récit*, and *narration* and that others have made similar distinctions (*Narrative Fiction*, 133, note 2). Seymour Chatman is one example. Chatman distinguishes between “discourse” (the expression of a narrative) and “story” (the content of a narrative). See Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978; Cornell Paperbacks, 1980), 26.

<sup>27</sup> Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction*, 34.

can be distinguished from any *particular event* in any particular narrative.<sup>28</sup> The limits of this form, however, do not limit the variety of ways this form can be expressed: “An infinite number of narrative texts can be described using the finite number of concepts contained within the narrative system.”<sup>29</sup> Much as a language system (*langue*) can be studied apart from the utterances (*parole*) which both rely on and give rise to the system itself, narrative structures and relationships can be described at a level removed from the specifics of any given narrative.<sup>30</sup>

This level of narrative analysis—the level of *story*—is helpful for metaphor interpretation. When John points to Jesus as the Lamb of God, he does not verbalize any particular events or outcomes. John’s words, however, do assume a “story” with implied participants and relationships quite distinct from other events or relationships which may involve a lamb. Metaphor interpretation is narrative in the sense that **the structured relationships assumed by any particular metaphor in its context can be described in terms of more general narrative structures.** This narrative structure can be shown as a model of relationships that, in turn, can be adapted for use in metaphor interpretation. The result is a method or tool useful for identifying, analyzing, and anticipating how preachers interpreting a biblical text and hearers interpreting a sermon will fill in the blanks left by metaphor.

### **The Actantial Model of A. J. Greimas: A Narrative Method**

The Lithuanian-born structuralist A. J. Greimas worked to describe the kind of fundamental narrative relationships that lie underneath the surface of any particular narration. Aspects of his

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>29</sup> Mieke Bal, *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*, trans. Christine van Boheemen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 3.

<sup>30</sup> The analogy between Ferdinand de Saussure’s work with *langue* and *parole* and the relationship between narrative form or structure and particular instances of narrative is also used by Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction*, 8, and Steve Cohan and Linda M. Shires, *Telling Stories: The Theoretical Analysis of Narrative Fiction*, New Accents, ed. Terence Hawkes (New York: Routledge, 1988), 53.

narrative theory have already been put to good use by exegetes and homiletics alike.<sup>31</sup>

Greimas' most helpful contribution to the current discussion comes from his analysis of a level between the deep structure and the surface presentation of a text, a level of basic narrative relationships. Using as examples work done by Vladimir Propp on Russian fairy tales and a theory of theater analysis proposed by Étienne Souriau, Greimas developed a model of important players, actions, and narrative relationships. Although possible *combinations* of characters and nuances of plot are unlimited, Greimas sought to describe a finite number of *relationships* that give structure to the particular events presented by any given narrative.

For Greimas, any narrative sequence assumes a basic set of relationships: a Sender intends to convey some benefit or Object to someone, the Receiver. The movement of the Object from the Sender to the Receiver is facilitated by the Subject, often the hero or protagonist. The Subject's job description of getting and delivering the Object is hindered by an Opponent. The Subject must overcome the Opponent with the aid of a Helper in order to deliver the Object to the Receiver. These relationships together comprise the "actantial model" (figure 1, below).




Figure 1. Greimas' Actantial Model

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<sup>31</sup> Daniel Patte is perhaps the best-known exegete to bring some of Greimas' insights to bear on the biblical text. Thomas Long wrote his doctoral dissertation at Princeton on the implications of Greimas' theory for preaching biblical narratives. I am unaware of anyone using Greimas to work with a general theory of metaphor. See Long's thesis, "Narrative Structure as Applied to Biblical Preaching: A Method for Using the Narrative Grammar of A. J. Greimas in the Development of Sermons on Biblical Narratives," (Ph. D. diss., Princeton) 1980 for a clear description of the general theory presented here.

Several “ground rules” of the actantial model will help guide the analysis of the implied narrative structure behind metaphor.

**1. Discrete individuals may occupy the actantial positions on Greimas’ model, but so may inanimate objects, character traits, or qualities.** Greimas distinguished *actants* from *actors*: *actants* (or *actantial positions*) are roles filled by different *actors* in different narrative sequences.<sup>32</sup> These “actors” however are not the Hollywood kind; in fact, key narrative roles are not necessarily filled by human beings at all. Sometimes attributes or inanimate objects do the job. The Little Lamb metaphor, for example, includes *individuals* like a shepherd, *inanimate objects* like a shepherd’s staff, and *character traits* like a shepherd’s courage or skill as actors in different actantial positions.<sup>33</sup> Even nonentities or counterfactuals may fill an actantial position. The Opponent, for example, will not necessarily be as concrete as a lion or an enemy army; often, some kind of *lack* is the underlying obstacle that must be overcome in order for the Subject to facilitate the movement of the Object from the Sender to the Receiver.<sup>34</sup> A shepherd overcomes not only opponents like bears and thieves, but also a lack of food, water, and shelter. In this way, “my shepherd” “knows my needs and well provides me.”

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<sup>32</sup> Propp’s distinction of “function” and “dramatis personae” Greimas describes as “spheres of action” and “characters” before settling on the distinction of “actant” and “actor.” Algirdas Julien Greimas, *Structural Semantics*, trans. Daniele McDowell, Ronald Schleifer, and Alan Velie (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 200. According to Greimas, different actors in different narrative sequences can be “occurrence expressions of the same actant . . . defined by the same sphere of activity” (ibid.). As Corina Galland, “An Introduction to the Method of A. J. Greimas,” in *The New Testament and Structuralism*, ed. and trans. Alfred M. Johnson, Jr. (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1976), 8 summarizes: “Unlike the *actor*, who is the character as he appears in the narrative, the *actant* is a semantic unit and it is situated on a more abstract level.”

<sup>33</sup> “It is necessary to state precisely that the actants are not necessarily anthropomorphous. They can also be abstract ideas, such as a desire to be healed, trust, or faith operating as a helper” (Galland, “Introduction,” 9).

<sup>34</sup> In some ways, lack is the quintessential Opponent that is overcome by definition when the Object is transferred to the Receiver. “The basic narrative syntagmatic unit is the action or, more precisely, the *transformation*. An Object is transmitted to a Receiver, who is transformed from a state of lack (not having the Object) to a state of lack fulfilled (having the Object)” Patte, *The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts*, 55.

**2. More than one actor may occupy a single actantial position in any given narrative sequence.** There are a limited number of actantial positions but an unlimited number of possible characters, character traits, or objects that can be related narratively. In practical terms, this means that all the important “players” in any given narrative situation can be placed somewhere on the actantial model, even if that means double casting.<sup>35</sup> In the Little Lamb metaphor, sheep receive from their shepherd more than one object; these benefits include but are not limited to provision, guidance, and quiet waters.<sup>36</sup>

**3. A single actor may occupy more than one actantial position in the same narrative structure.** The actantial model also allows for the fact that sometimes the same individual, character trait, or object may occupy more than one actantial position in the same narrative sequence.<sup>37</sup> The shepherd, for example, is the Sender who communicates benefits like safety or guidance, the Object, to sheep in the Receiver slot. At the same time, the shepherd is also the Subject who, with the aid of Helpers like the shepherd’s staff or courage, overcomes Opponents like bears or wolves and therefore facilitates the communication of the Object to the Receiver.

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<sup>35</sup> For Greimas, we can consider two characters with the same function “as two ‘actors’ of a single actant” (*Structural Semantics*, 204). This is in fact how Greimas gets from Propp’s list of 31 functions down to only 6 actantial positions; many of the functions in Propp are combined into a single actant in Greimas (the dispatcher and the father of the sought-for person, for example, both fit the actantial slot of Sender). Galland notices another important difference between Propp and Greimas: Propp’s functions are organized in a linear order, progressing narratively from one to the next over time. Greimas on the other hand analyzes functions or spheres of influence “according to a paradigmatic dimension, that is to say, in their achronic relationship of associations” (“Introduction,” 9). This focus on achronic, paradigmatic relationships is an important reason why Greimas is useful for a narrative approach to metaphor: metaphor interpretation depends in part on narrative relationships or implications but does not give us narrative development over time.

<sup>36</sup> Galland offers another example: “Several explicit actors or characters can form a single actant in a narrative. If a little girl departs on a search for her little brother and is helped by a stove, a river, and an apple-tree, the stove, river, and apple-tree are actors who form only one actant, the helper” (“Introduction,” 8).

<sup>37</sup> Greimas refers to the “often noticed plurality of two actants present under the form of one actor” (*Structural Semantics*, 203). In other words, as Daniel Patte puts it, “the same personage of the manifestation may actualize several actantial positions.” Daniel Patte, *What is Structural Exegesis?*, Guides to Biblical Scholarship New Testament Series, ed. Dan O. Via, Jr. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 43. Galland is even more succinct: a “single actor can occupy one or several actantial positions” (“Introduction,” 9).



**4. Though specific actors may change from one narrative sequence to the next, the narrative relationships expressed by the model remain constant.** God might be sending the Holy Grail to humanity, or lovers could be seeking to send marital bliss to themselves; the Helper could be a magical sword, super-human strength, or Jiminy Cricket; the Opponent could be a big bad wolf, the dark side of the Force, or a lack of money. The particular manifestations of these actants change from narrative to narrative, but the same basic structure of narrative relationships continues to guide and constrain how specific narratives take shape.<sup>38</sup>

**5. Any individual actantial position presupposes an entire actantial model.** Because the actantial model expresses a network of relationships, knowing one part of the network assumes the existence of the rest of the model; the tip of the iceberg is an indication of what lies beneath.<sup>39</sup> This dynamic is especially important for metaphor theory where many important things—or kinds of things—that play a part in metaphor interpretation are often left unexpressed.<sup>40</sup> Though metaphor is therefore open to a variety of interpretations, these interpretations are not completely random or subjective. Even a few details expressed in an utterance, even a single actor placed in an actantial position will presuppose a broader narrative structure that guides how the rest of the metaphor is understood.<sup>41</sup> To call Jesus the “Lamb of

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<sup>38</sup> “The analyst must keep in mind that the structure as a relational network is a *constant* which is itself semantically empty and is only manifested when invested by *variable* semantic features.” Daniel Patte, translator’s preface to Jean Calloud, *Structural Analysis of Narrative*, The Society of Biblical Literature Semeia Supplements, ed. William A. Beardslee (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), xii, emphasis original.

<sup>39</sup> Daniel Patte identifies this important feature of analysis: “This actantial model is presupposed, evoked, suggested by any personage of the manifestation even though only a part of the model might be actualized” (*What is Structural Exegesis?*, 43).

<sup>40</sup> Because it includes both specific actors which are variable and more abstract actantial positions which are constant, the actantial model is able to describe in part how metaphor can be open to a range of interpretations without becoming arbitrary. See the discussion of “underdetermination” in chapter 3, below (pp. 91–101).

<sup>41</sup> This important relationship between *an actor* specifically manifested in the text, *an actantial position* filled by that actor, and *the broader system* of actantial relationships assumed by even a single actantial position relies on basic tenets of structuralist theory. Though words are related *synatagmatically* in an utterance (*parole*)—that is, words and their meanings depend on other words and their meanings in close temporal or spatial relationship—

God,” for example, is to presuppose an entire actantial model in which God sends forgiveness to sinners, facilitated by the sacrificial lamb who overcomes the sin of the world and perhaps even the wrath of God with the help of things like the lamb’s unblemished perfection or the promise of God.<sup>42</sup> These actors and actantial relationships can be expressed in terms of Greimas’ model. See figure 2a, below.




Figure 2a. The Lamb of God

Figure 2a shows one way of filling in the blanks left by the Lamb of God metaphor. It combines elements overtly expressed by the text with elements assumed by the sacrificial system. Though the specifics interpreters use to fill in the blanks may vary, the blanks

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structuralism focuses on the *paradigmatic relationships* of words in the language system (*langue*) to which they belong. This language system is “not merely a *list* of words, but an organized whole, a *system* of words which are related to each other in specific ways” (Patte, *Structural Exegesis*, 27). Words evoke meanings not only in relationship to the other words around them in an utterance but also in relationship to the language system to which they belong. In a similar move, I am arguing that what maps in metaphor (and therefore what a metaphor means) is not a *list* of features but a *relational system*, only some of which finds explicit expression. Following the structuralists on this point, I want to read metaphors *paradigmatically*. We should therefore expect only parts of the actantial model to be expressed, even if we take the model as a whole to be guiding interpretation: “A paradigmatic reading gathers together the elements which manifest in the text a given structure. Yet it should be kept in mind that *these elements manifest only a part of this structure*: they evoke, suggest, and presuppose the structure. Thus in the paradigmatic reading of any text one cannot expect to find the whole structure. The structure has to be reconstructed from the few of its elements which are manifested” (Patte, *Structural Exegesis*, 26).

<sup>42</sup> An implied narrative would shape our understanding of this metaphor even if we did not have the rest of John’s gospel narrative to flesh out what “Lamb of God” means. Many Pauline metaphors, for example, have no expressed narrative setting. When Paul uses armor or citizenship metaphorically, he assumes a situation or narrative in which armor or citizenship plays a meaningful part. He does not, however, tell us a story about soldiers or Roman citizens. We must—in fact, we do, consciously or not—posit some kind of situation or narrative setting in order to make interpretive decisions about metaphor.

themselves (that is, the actantial positions) help shape how a metaphor is understood. Some interpreters might not consider the wrath of God as an Opponent in the Lamb of God metaphor, but *some kind* of Opponent will be understood, even if an individual interpreter never takes a step back to ask *what exactly* must be overcome in the sacrificial system in order for forgiveness to be given to sinners.<sup>43</sup>

Just as the Lamb of God metaphor includes an underlying narrative structure expressible by an actantial model, “I am Jesus’ little lamb” also presupposes a whole network of narrative relationships. In fact, *the difference in meaning and implication between these two very different lamb metaphors is precisely the difference in their implied narratives*, the structures of which can be expressed by using Greimas’ actantial model. Again in figure 2b, below, some details are provided by the text and some must be provided by the interpreter. The range of possibilities is constrained by narrative relationships assumed by the metaphor.




Figure 2b. I Am Jesus’ Little Lamb

<sup>43</sup> The relationship between more general actantial positions and specific actors explains in part why some variation in the specifics of interpretation is inevitable and does not necessarily constitute contrary understandings of a metaphor. If the actantial positions and relationships are understood coherently, variation in actors will not greatly affect interpretation. See the discussion of underdetermination in chapter 3, below, esp. pp. 94–98.

Though different interpreters might dispute whether or not a shepherd's staff or courage, for example, are suggested by this second metaphor, they will likely understand *those kinds of things*, even if they can't agree on *which particular* things are specifically intended. More important than a specific list of shepherding paraphernalia is the fact that the *kinds of things* that come into question for the Little Lamb metaphor are decidedly different from the kinds of actors, relationships, and outcomes presupposed by the Lamb of God metaphor. In fact, the lamb in each metaphor finds itself in a different actantial position. In the sacrificial system, the lamb functions as the Subject that acts to bring God's forgiveness to sinners. In the pastoral setting the lamb is the Receiver of the shepherd's good intentions and action. *What an interpreter will expect from, or infer about, a lamb is directly related to the lamb's relationship to other significant characters and outcomes in the basic narrative setting assumed by the metaphor.* In other words, the lamb's actantial position guides the interpretive decisions and conclusions in each of these different lamb metaphors.

It seems natural to say that "I" am not a lamb in the same way Jesus is. Slowing down to consider the network of narrative implications behind metaphor helps express why this is the case. If *I* am the lamb, the lamb is the Receiver of the Shepherd's loving care. If *Jesus* is the lamb, "I" am still the Receiver, the guilty sinner in this case, but the lamb is the Subject who facilitates "my forgiveness." I am not a lamb in the same way Jesus is because *these two metaphors assume different implied narratives.*

A schema of narrative relationships guides and constrains the process of filling in a metaphor's implied narrative blanks. This concern for the implied narrative structure, for the story behind the image, facilitates the preacher's movement to the biblical text on behalf of the hearers and back to the hearers on behalf of God. Greimas' actantial model provides an interpretive tool, a method for describing narrative structure. In order to describe the implied

narrative structure of metaphor, however, Greimas' model must be adapted to include the basic duality inherent in metaphor.<sup>44</sup>

### **Metaphor's Basic Duality: Narrative Structure in Source and Target Domains**

The interpretation of a "lamb" metaphor will change dramatically, depending on whether the lamb is in a *pastoral* setting or a *sacrificial* one. To say it another way, interpreting a particular metaphorical utterance in a particular cultural and communicative context entails making a decision about the particular situation assumed by the culture, the context, and/or the speaker. A hearer or reader must know what is being expected of (or done to) a lamb in the right kind of situation in order to make sense of any lamb metaphor.

The particular narrative setting of a *lamb*, however, is only half of the story. When John the Baptist says, "Behold! The lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world," he is not, in fact, talking about a *lamb*; John is using the *story of a lamb*—a lamb in a sacrificial, *not* pastoral, setting—to speak about the *story of Jesus*.<sup>45</sup> **Metaphor entails thinking about, speaking of, or experiencing *one thing* in terms of *something else*.**

### **Source and Target Domains**

This basic duality of *one thing* in terms of *something else* is widely recognized in the broad field of metaphor theory and has been described using various terms.<sup>46</sup> A common way of

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<sup>44</sup> Appendix 1, below, considers different ways of describing metaphor's inherent duality—as well as some perspectives on metaphor that do not emphasize duality at all.

<sup>45</sup> According to Mark Turner, "*The Literary Mind*," the basic building blocks of metaphor (and, for Turner, of thought itself) include not only "story" but also "projection." In other words, it is not enough to notice that the lamb of God metaphor requires a particular story involving lambs, sacrifice, and sinners in order to be understood; we must go one step further and see that the story of a sacrificial lamb (as opposed to the story of a shepherd and his lamb) is being *projected* onto the story of Jesus. Turner's discussion is not confined to metaphor, though it does clearly demonstrate that metaphor involves both story and projection.

<sup>46</sup> More important than differing nomenclature, however, is how an account of metaphor understands this basic duality. Briefly, metaphor can be described as a way of swapping out one *word* for another. Max Black labeled this the "Substitution View" of metaphor. Though it does describe metaphor up to a point, as a working definition it is

designating this duality in contemporary theory is to speak of two “domains” of knowledge or experience. Some aspects of one conceptual domain, the “source,” are “mapped” onto a second conceptual domain, the “target.”<sup>47</sup> These domains are not amorphous; rather, they have a particular shape or structure that plays an important role in mapping from one domain to another.<sup>48</sup> The narrative approach to metaphor proposed by this dissertation combines the claim that both domains are *structured* with the insight that understanding metaphor depends on understanding a particular *situation* or rudimentary *story*.<sup>49</sup> From a narrative perspective, then, **metaphor entails mapping from a *narrative structure* in the source domain to a *narrative structure* in the target domain.**

### Actantial Models in Source and Target Domains

Greimas’ actantial model was used above to describe the very different narrative structures of sacrifice and shepherding. The narrative structure of the source domain in “I am Jesus’ little

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neither unique to metaphor nor sufficient for describing the most important aspects of metaphor interpretation. Understanding metaphor as a kind of split *reference* leads to what Black called the “Comparison View” of metaphor. Again, this approach may be seen as superficially correct up to a point, but also inadequate. More helpful for the approach offered here is understanding the duality of metaphor at the level of *thought* (I. A. Richards, for example) or at the level of *implied situation* (Roger White is best classified here, though he himself labels his approach polarity at the level of *sentence*). For a more complete discussion and examples of these (and other) approaches, see appendix 1: Describing the Duality of Metaphor, below.

<sup>47</sup> The language of “source” and “target” domains is taken from the cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor characterized by the work of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Mark Turner, described in appendix 1, below, as well as in chapter 5. Using these terms does not imply an uncritical acceptance of the entire Lakoff-Johnson-Turner position, nor does it suggest that other terms may not have as much or more theoretical value (I. A. Richards’ “tenor” and “vehicle,” for example). The terms “source” and “target” are chosen here because they are widely used and sufficiently descriptive.

<sup>48</sup> Though this claim is a prominent feature of the Lakoff-Johnson-Turner approach, it is not completely novel. Max Black, for example, was already dealing with metaphor in terms of a kind of structure, a “set of associated commonplaces,” though he unfortunately backed away from some of his original work: “*The secondary subject* [what we have here called the source domain] *is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing*. While Black considers his earlier view that this claim holds with equal force for the primary subject [our target domain] ‘not plainly mistaken,’ he apparently does no longer want to endorse it without qualification. This is an unfortunate lapse from the older, and highly correct, notion.” Charles Forceville, *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 7.

<sup>49</sup> Again, the narrative quality inherent in metaphor has been hinted at in works by Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner. We cited a few of these above (p. 36). Metaphor’s connection to narrative, however, is not unique to this particular strand of metaphor theory. See appendix 1: Describing the Duality of Metaphor, below.

lamb” was given in figure 2a. The significantly different structure of the source domain from “Behold, the lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world!” was represented by figure 2b. Two very different narrative structures in the source domain lead to two very different lamb metaphors.

Figures 2a and 2b, however, describe only one of the domains involved in metaphor mapping. Because metaphor involves thinking about, speaking of, or experiencing *one thing* in terms of *something else*, metaphor mapping actually requires a narrative structure in the target domain as well. Placing an actantial model that accounts for key elements of the source next to an actantial model that describes key elements of the target helps to clarify how the two domains relate to each other. The first step in aligning two distinct narrative structures is to flatten the actantial model while preserving its slots and relationships (see figure 3a, below).




Figure 3a. A Vertical Actantial Model

None of the actantial relationships have changed on this model. The Helper is still the one who helps the Subject overcome the Opponent and deliver the Object from the Sender to the

Receiver. What has changed is the orientation: what was a primarily left-to-right orientation is now up-and-down. This minor change allows two actantial models to be placed side by side in a way that shows more clearly the relationship between the source and the target. Actors and actantial positions in one domain can line up with actors and actantial positions in the other. The result is figure 3b, below.




Figure 3b. Actantial Models in the Source and the Target

In metaphor, both source and target domains are structured in terms of narrative relationships. Moreover, relationships and outcomes assumed by the source are intended to correspond to relationships and outcomes in the target: Helpers align with Helpers, Opponents with Opponents, and so on. In the two lamb metaphors, for example, different knowledge and relationships expressed by the actantial model in the source will be mapped onto different knowledge or relationships in the target. Figures 4a and 5a, below, are fuller descriptions of the lamb metaphors discussed above.






Figure 4a. The Lamb of God Actantial Models in Source and Target Domains

Figure 4a, above, represents the narrative structure of sacrifice for both the source and the target domains. Understanding Jesus as the Lamb of God means understanding a structure of narrative relationships. Reorganizing the narrative structure of the source domain would change the meaning of the metaphor. Using narrative relationships and expectations of an animal rights paradigm in the source, for example, would change what the metaphor is saying about the target. Likewise, changing the narrative setting of sacrifice to a narrative setting of sheep and shepherds also changes the expectations and inferences appropriate for the lamb.




Figure 5a. Jesus’ Little Lamb Actantial Models in Source and Target Domains

Specific narrative relationships in the source domain are also mirrored in the target domain in figure 5a, above. This time the narrative structure involves some of the same actors but some very different specifics. Just as wolves would be out of place in a sacrificial structure, blood and substitution are absent here. The meaning of the two lamb metaphors depends on the shape of the narrative structure given to both the source and the target domain in the process of interpreting the metaphor.

Though both the Lamb of God and Little Lamb metaphors are common, straightforward, and relatively easy to understand, the interpretive dynamics behind these metaphors are by no means simple or rudimentary. In fact, identifying a narrative structure in both the source and the

target domains is just a beginning. Recognizing two distinct domains and understanding their structure narratively are important insights moving in the right direction. Metaphor interpretation, however, hinges not only on the existence of two domains, but also on how these two domains relate to each other. Describing the structure of both the source and the target domains in terms of the actantial model is a point of departure; complexities of these cross-domain relationships will be treated in chapter 3.

### **Conclusion: Source and Target Domains in Php 3:20**

Chapter 2 began by considering the kinds of homiletical questions raised with Paul's metaphor in Php 3:20: "but our citizenship is in heaven." What will come to mind for typical hearers in a particular congregation if the sermon focuses on heavenly citizenship? Which, if any, of the hearers' most typical or immediate associations should play an important role in the sermon? How much background information is relevant for this metaphor? Identifying two distinct domains is an important first step in giving a sufficient account of this metaphor.

Though it may seem obvious that Paul is speaking of one thing (the Church's ongoing existence in the world) in terms of something else (Roman citizens living in a foreign land), organizing and clarifying interpretive decisions in terms of two distinct domains is already a significant move. In fact, I. A. Richards, one of the most important 20<sup>th</sup> century figures in metaphor theory, regarded confusion between two distinct domains as one of the fundamental obstacles to a clearer understanding of how metaphor works.<sup>50</sup>

Some of the questions raised of Php 3:20 at the beginning of the chapter are concerned with what should or should not be included in the *source* domain: is it significant that Roman citizens

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<sup>50</sup> Richards introduces his famous terms "tenor" (our target domain) and "vehicle" (our source domain) for the express purpose of clearing up this confusion. See I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, "Lecture V: Metaphor," in *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 52–55.

wore distinctive clothing, had distinctive speech, and were afforded legal rights? Is it significant that Americans vote and pay taxes? Some are focused on the *target* domain: what is a Christian's ultimate hope? Does being Christian make people good citizens? Many of the questions, however, have to do with how the source domain relates to the target domain: questions of how to preach law and gospel from this text or how unbelievers should be considered in the terms of this metaphor are questions of how the target domain of the Christian Church is to be understood in terms of the dynamics of earthly citizenship and struggle.

Questions about what is included or excluded from the source or the target and questions of how the two domains relate can be answered in terms of the shape of the narrative structure used to understand the metaphor. Just as *wolves* are not a part of the source domain in the Lamb of God metaphor because wolves find no place in the narrative structure of *sacrifice*, and *blood* is not a part of the source domain of the Little Lamb metaphor because blood is not relevant to the narrative structure of *shepherds and sheep*, determining what should or should not be a part of the source or target domains in Php 3:20 means asking about the narrative structure appropriate to this particular metaphor of citizenship.

Paul, however, does not give a narration on citizenship. An appropriate narrative structure must therefore be determined by the interpreter, even if unawares. The context of Php 3:20 gives some interpretive cues, just as a preacher may express specific details to help hearers understand a metaphor in a sermon. Many times, however, there is more to a metaphor than what is expressly made evident in the text or utterance. Establishing the shape of a metaphor's narrative structure often requires cultural or experiential knowledge outside of the utterance itself.

How should the metaphor of citizenship in Php 3:20 be understood? Answering that question involves describing the structure of the source domain, the structure of the target domain, and how the two domains relate, in part on the basis of textual and extra-textual

evidence. There is an important relationship between a metaphor and its surrounding context as well as between a metaphor's source and target domains. Chapter 3 considers these relationships that shape metaphor interpretation from a narrative perspective.